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On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States in a
trilogy of cases, United States v. Wade,' Gilbert v. California2 and
Stovall v. Denno, dealt with the constitutionality of police practices
and procedures in obtaining eyewitness identifications. These decisions
marked the Supreme Court's first major attempt to confront the "dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility inherent
in the context of the pretrial identification. ' 4 The Court's primary concern was to evolve legal standards and remedies that would substantially reduce erroneous identification. On account of the risk of intentional and unintentional suggestibility at lineups resulting in error and
abuse in making identifications, and the concomitant difficulty of
reconstructing lineup events for purposes of discrediting a witness'
testimony at trial, the lineup was deemed a "critical stage" in the trial
process during which suspects were to be protected by the sixth amendment right to counsel. Ambiguities remained as to the scope and meaning of this new right.
Since 1967 state appellate courts and federal courts of appeals
have evolved standards and criteria-sometimes rather contradictory
-for determining when this aspect of the right to counsel attaches.
Although the primary objective of Wade was to protect the factfinding
process from erroneous identifications, lower courts failed to analyze
cases in terms of the basic criteria of the "critical stage" assessment:
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tification at trial to allow meaningful cross-examination.' On June 7,
1972, five years after Wade, the Supreme Court in handing down
Kirby v. Illinois6 also ignored the issues that rendered lineups a critical
stage.7 In Kirby the Court followed the most narrow and least frequent of the lower court rulings and limited the Wade principle strictly
to its facts, i.e., to post-indictment lineups, although Wade had not
made this distinction in developing "critical stage" standards.8
The Kirby decision in its superficial approach created the possibility for increased abuse. While the right to counsel may now be administered by the easy standard of whether or not an indictment has occurred, the Court left "the police in the position to manipulate the
applicability of the right to counsel by holding all identification procedures before the indictment, thus defeating the aim of the Wade and
Gilbert rulings." 9 The incidence of such manipulation (which bears no
relationship to defendants' need for counsel to safeguard constitutional
rights) is probably rather common. On April 2, 1973, Time magazine's
report of two mistaken identifications of an assistant district attorney
and a sanitation department chauffeur in connection with a charge of
sexual assault served as a reminder of the frequent unreliability of
police lineups. The article concluded, "In 1967, Earl Warren's Supreme Court expressed its wariness of lineups by holding that an indicted suspect was entitled to have his lawyer present to prevent at
least the obvious inequities. But the Burger Court last year [i.e.,
Kirby, 1972] cut into that right by refusing to apply it before the
5 Comment, The Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower
Courts, 36 U. Cnr. L. Rav. 830, 839 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Right to Counsel].
For a review of the meaning of "critical stage" for the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall Court and
the failure of lower courts to consider cases in terms of the dangers of eyewitness identification, see Note, PretrialIdentification Procedures-Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower
Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 Mn;N. L. Rxv. 779 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Pretrial
Identification]; Comment, No Panacea: ConstitutionalSupervision of Eyewitness Identification, 62 J. Cram. L.C. & P.S. 363 (1971) [hereinafter cited as No Panacea].
6406 U.S. 682 (1972).
7 For a, discussion of the pre-indictment exception and relevant court decisions, see
Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of the Eyewitness Identification Cases,
42 U. COL. L. Rrv. 135, 143-44 (1970). Quinn, in citing especially People v. Fowler,
76 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. App.), vacated on other grounds, I Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643,
82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969) (holding right to counsel at lineup applicable before indictment),
emphasized that pre-indictment lineups were certainly as "critical" as post-indictment
lineups. Most federal and state courts seem to apply Wade broadly and do not read
Wade as intending to be limited to its facts. In addition to Quinn, see Dienes, Right to
Counsel, 30 N.L.A.D.A. BRaTzacAsE 25 (1971); Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the Abuse of Pre-trial Criminal Identification Methods,
38 BROOxLyw L. Rav. 261, 274-75 (1971); No Panacea, supra note 5, at 364, 365.
In fact the Court, in defining the lineup as a critical stage, expressly relied on
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which involved the right to counsel before
arraignment. Further, the Wade Court explicitly stated that it was required to "scrutinize
any pretrial confrontation," 388 U.S. at 227.
9Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 837.
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suspect has been indicted. Thus police now often delay formal charges
until after the lineup."'0
Thus, while Wade mandated reforms of lineup procedures, subsequent decisions, including Kirby, reveal diminished judicial concern
with this area. In light of this withdrawal by the courts from an area
essential to the improvement of the criminal justice system, this
Article seeks to revive the basic concerns of Wade. Its primary focus
is to review and assess the empirical evidence related to reducing
identification error and increasing accuracy and to suggest the potential
use and limitations of this body of knowledge for remedying the problems of pretrial confrontations.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

In the words of Judge McGowan, "the vagaries of visual identification [have] been thought by many experts to present what is conceivably the greatest threat to the achievement of our ideal that no innocent man shall be punished."' 1 Erroneous identification of criminal
suspects has long been recognized by commentators as a crucial problem in the administration of justice." Numerous examples of misidentification have been extensively documented. 3 In fact the lineup
procedure itself was developed by the British police because showup
confrontation was considered grossly suggestive and unfair.' 4 The
problem is particularly crucial because potential jurors-and many
law enforcement officials and judges-do not regard eyewitness identification with the same skepticism; for them, visual identification is
one of the most, if not the most, persuasive kinds of evidence that can
10 T=ra, Apr. 2, 1973, at 59.
11Lecture by McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification,
4th Annual G.B. Sherwell Lecture, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, Oct. 1970, printed in
12 VM. & MAr L. REv. 235 (1970).
12 See, e.g., E. BoRcEARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932) ; J. FRANK & B. FRANK,
NOT GUILTY (1957); F. FRANKTURTER, TnE CASE Or SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927);
M. HouTs, From EVIDENCE TO PROOF (1956); J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY In
CONFLIC'T (1966); P. WALL, EYE-WITN ESS IDENTiFICATioN iN CaumqAL CASES (1965);
B. VENTWORT: & H. VILDER, PERSONAL IDENTMICATION (1918); J. WIGMORE, THE
SciENcE oF JuDIcIAL PRooF (3d ed. 1937); 3 J. WIGMoRE, EvDENCE § 786a (3d ed.
1940); Gorphe, Showing Prisoners to Witnesses for Identification, 1 Air. J. PoLICE SCI.
79 (1930).
3
1 See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, supra note 12; J. FRANK & B. FRANK, supra note 12;
F. FRANKFrURTER, supra note 12; E. GARDNER, THE COURT Or LAST RESORT (1952);
Q. REYNOLDS, CouRToom (1950); G. WiLLIAmS, TriE PROOF or GuILT (3d ed. 1963).
supra note 10, also reported some recent independent investigation being executed
Tai,
by a New York judge. "[F]or nearly a year he had been using a neat double-check
system of eyewitnesses. In ten cases where identification constituted virtually the only
evidence, [the judge] permitted defense attorneys to seat a look-alike beside the defendant
in court. In only two cases did the previous identification hold up."
14 p. WALL, supra note 12; Quinn, supra note 7.
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be presented.15 Therefore, inaccurate identification has been and continues to be a major source of faulty convictions.
A striking example of the popular attitude toward eyewitness identification appeared in the Senate committee hearings on the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.16 In response to the Wade,
Gilbert, and Stovall rulings, the committee labelled eyewitness testimony "an essential prosecutorial tool," and accused the Supreme
Court of having struck "a harmful blow at the nationwide effort to control crime.' 7 Evidently, in this area, not only does the commonsense
knowledge of laymen conflict with much expert knowledge, but opinions from law enforcement officials, legislators and jurists also conflict.
Yet inaccurate identification has been and continues to be a major
source of faulty convictions.
This situation only underscores the necessity of improving the
quality of pretrial identification proceedings and thus reducing the
number of faulty identifications available for use in prosecutions. The
Wade trilogy involved two types of pretrial identifications: the lineup,
which is the focus of this Article, and, in Stovall, the showup, or formal
one-to-one confrontation between witness and suspect. As noted above,
the Court in Wade viewed the lineup as a "critical stage" because "the
confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might
seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.' 8 Among these
factors were the well-known "vagaries of eyewitness identification,"
the potential for improper intentional and unintentional suggestion, and
the emotional state of the witness. 19 In addition the Court called upon
federal and state legislatures, prosecutors and police departments to
design regulations to "eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional
suggestion at lineup proceedings .... [that] may also remove the basis
for regarding the stage as 'critical.' ,,2O In short, "[b]y creating a new
right to counsel but emphasizing that the requirement depends upon
the continued categorization of the line-up as a 'critical stage,' the Court
could immediately attack the worst abuses while retaining maximum
21
long-run flexibility.1
5
-1
See, e.g., P. WALL, supra note 12; Sobel, supra note 7; Comment, Erroneous
Eyewitness Identification at Lineups-The Problem and Its Cure, 5 U.S.F.L. REv. 85
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Erroneous Eyewitness].
1618 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970).
17S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1968).
18 388 U.S. at 228.

19 Id. 228-35.

2oId. 239.
21 Comment, Lawlers qtnd Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390, 399 (1967).
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The Court did not go so far as to rule that all courtroom identifications of suspects where defense counsel was absent from a lineup must
be excluded. Instead, the decision allowed the prosecution "the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court
identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than
the lineup identification. ' 2 In practice this independent origins test
has been construed by the lower courts to allow the admission of identification testimony in most cases.23
In Stovall, the Court acknowledged the even greater risks of
abuse and suggestion present in a showup. But it refused to forbid all
showups or insist on the presence of defense counsel on the grounds
that the risks to the suspect in some cases are outweighed by the need
for immediate identification (for example, in Stovall, the victim was
in critical condition). In a holding which has been applied to both
lineup and showup identifications, the Court said, "a claimed violation
of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the
totality of the circumstances surrounding it, and the record in the present case reveals that the showing of Stovall ...in an immediate hospital confrontation was imperative. ' Likewise, as with the "independent source" test, lower courts have applied the "totality" test with
great flexibility. As one set of commentators reviewing the impact of
Stovall observed, "[L]ower courts go well beyond the Court's application of the 'totality' test. In the opinion of those courts, a showup may
be used any time if external factors lead to the conclusion that the
identification was correct."2 5 They went on to conclude, "If courts
continue to find a violation of due process only in the face of flagrant
police conduct, the spirit in which Stovall was decided will, in all but
a few isolated cases, be effectively throttled. 2
While the Wade Court explicitly suggested legislative reform,
there has been little legislative attempt to respond to the Court's call
for improvement of lineup proceedings. In fact, the United States Congress repudiated the holdings of the Wade trilogy. Title II, section
701 (a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
states, "The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit
or participate in the commission of the crime for which the accused is
being tried shall be admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution
22 388 U.S. at 240.
2

3See Quinn, supra note 7, at 140-43; PretrialIdentification, supra note 5, at 815-17;
Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 833 n.14.
24388 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added).
25
Pretrial Identification, supra note 5, at 790.
2
06 d.803.
27 38s U.S. at 239.
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in any trial court ordained and established under article III of the
Constitution of the United States."2 8 Most commentators, however,
have little doubt that this section, if challenged, would be declared unconstitutional.

29

For the most part, police regulations promulgated after Wade
conformed to the guidelines set forth by the Court. As Read's review
of various police lineup procedures8" and the Columbia Journal of Law
and Social Problems' empirical survey of police regulations3 1 reveal,
Wade stimulated new efforts to formulate standards meeting criteria of
"due process" and "fairness." In the main these suggested procedures,
though by no means uniformly enforced or of equal caliber, guarantee
the right to counsel and respond to the most obvious forms of abusive
practice. For example, they typically advise that lineup participants be
of generally the same age, sex, height, weight and race, and some
stipulate that they must wear similar clothing. These regulations have
probably somewhat improved the fairness and reliability of lineup
identifications. But they include only the most general references
regarding the protection of the accused from suggestive influences, a
basic goal of the Wade decision.8
Groups within the legal profession, which historically has been
more skeptical than police officers about the reliability of eyewitness
identification, also have developed guidelines for lineup procedures.
These, however, tend to be only slightly more sophisticated than most
of the police regulations. They typically suggest that no lineup participant be required to speak, model clothing or perform any action unless
all other participants are required to do the same, and are stricter
about contact among different witnesses. 8 But like police guidelines,
2818 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970).

29
See, e.g., Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable
Extravagance?, 17 U.CL.AL. Rav. 339, 360 (1969) ; Comment, Protection of the Accused
at Police Lineups, 6 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 345 n.3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Protection
of the Accused]; Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 830-31. See also Note, Survey of
Title II: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 Am. U.L. EV. 157
(1968); Note, Title I1 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
82 HARv. L. REv. 1392 (1969); Comment, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study

of the Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 Na. L. RFv. 193 (1968).
30 Read, supra note 29, at 367-75.

31Protection of the Accused, supra note 29, at 360-67.

32
For example, one of the best police department standards was adopted in New
York City, T.O.P. 318, July 26, 1967. Rule No. 9 stipulates that "no suggestions, direct
or indirect, may be communicated to the witness or victim as to which member of the

group is believed to be the culprit or non-culprit." While such a regulation recognizes
the problem of suggestibility, it fails to describe the nature of pre- and postlineup
suggestive
effects or to establish precise guidelines for coping with them.
33
For a suggested procedure for lineup identification drafted jointly by the District
Attorney's Office and the Public Defender's Office in Clark County, Nevada, see 4
DEFENDER NEWSLETTER 55 (1967). See also ALI MODEL CODE OF PPa-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDuRES, § A5.09 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968). Extensive reviews of various proce-

dures appear in Read, supra note 29, at 367-75; Sobel, supra note 7; Pretrial Identification, supra note 5; Protection of the Accused, supra note 29, at 365-75.
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they reflect little understanding of the dynamics of suggestive influences and make almost no reference to the problems arising from fallible perception and memory.
The courts which have applied the Wade holdings generally have
interpreted them to justify many pretrial confrontations which did not
conform to even the minimal new police standards. The Wade "independent source" rule and the Stovall "totality of the circumstances"
guideline have often been used to affirm convictions whenever external
factors suggest that the identification was correct, no matter how
questionable the confrontation procedure. 4 "Inother words, anything
goes as long as he's guilty: an attitude which does little to insure
proper respect by law enforcement officials for constitutional rights.1 35
Thus, at present none of the three branches of government at federal,
state or local levels nor the bar have made much progress toward reducing the innumerable dangers or controlling the variable factors
present in identification situations.
Identification may be fraught with either of two basic kinds of
errors. The first, which has received the most attention, is identification of the wrong person as the criminal; the second is failure to
identify the right person." The first kind of error may be either more
common or somewhat easier to detect, and, in a system of jurisprudence based on the presumption of innocence, it is far more dangerous.
But the second type of mistake also unfortunately occurs. The presumption of innocence is not incompatible with a commitment to the
prevention of crime. If there is a mistaken identification, the real
criminal is still loose, and, whatever may be said about the morality or
the utility of punishment, identification of offenders is essential to any
plan for crime prevention. The variables we shall examine should be
related to increasing overall accuracy and thus should contribute to
reducing either kind of error. Both types of error pose serious problems,
and ideally procedures and standards should be developed for preventing both.
One of the difficulties in regulating lineup procedures is that the
circumstances under which they occur are so variable. It may be useful, however, at this point to describe briefly what a lineup identification involves, and its place in criminal procedure. A lineup can occur
from one or two days to weeks or even months after the crime. The
witness may be either the victim of the crime or a bystander. He or she
34

Pretrial Identification, supra note 5, passim.

35

Id. 790.

36These two forms of identification error parallel the error that may emerge in
hypothesis testing in statistical analysis. Type I error refers to invalid confirmation or a
false positive. Type II error refers to invalid disconfirmation or a false negative.
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typically will have been questioned by police soon after the crime,
asked to describe the offender, and perhaps also requested to view
photos for a possible identification. At that time the police probably
will not have a particular suspect in mind unless either the description
or the modus operandi struck familiar chords, and therefore the potential for improper suggestion usually will be minimal. In the actual
lineup, however, the police will almost always have a definite suspect,
and there is substantial potential for suggestion.
If the witness identifies a lineup participant as the perpetrator of
the crime, he or she will ordinarily be asked to testify to this at the
trial, if there is one. The last qualifying clause is crucial; as a substantial body of recent scholarly and popular literature has shown, 7
only a small percentage of criminal cases actually come to trial. The
great majority are settled by plea bargaining, and because of popular
faith in eyewitness identification, it is probable that a "positive" identification often contributes to persuading the suspect and his attorney to
accept a guilty plea. Therefore, most often the witness is not challenged
by cross-examination, the one procedure which might call the identification into question.
In sum, the identification process has at least three, and sometimes four, steps. First, the witness perceives the crime. Second, the
police question the witness. Third, the witness identifies the criminal.
Fourth, the witness may testify at the suspect's trial; however, so few
cases actually come to trial that the fourth stage may be less crucial
for analysis than the preponderant research emphasis on courtroom
behavior would suggest. The first stage-witnessing the crime, whether
as victim or bystander-involves perception of an event actually occurring. The second stage-answering police questions-involves the
witness' memory, or more specifically, free recall of the person(s) and
the event. The lineup involves recognition memory and present perception. The phenomena of perception and memory, thus, each come
into play more than once in the identification process.
In order to achieve a more scientific and systematized identification process, further improvements are required in all of these stages.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Wade, citing Wigmore's suggested
"scientific method" from several decades ago, 8 "the more systematic
and scientific a process or proceeding, including one for purposes of
identification, the less the impediment to reconstruction of the condi37 See, e.g., A. BLUMBERG, CUiALr
JusTE 9-10, 28-32 (1967); Tigar, Foreword:
Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel--The Supreme Court, 1969
Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1970); L=a, Mar. 12, 1971, at 56-58.
38J. \WGmo,
THuE ScIENcE OF JUDICriL PROOF 541 (3d ed. 1937).
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tions bearing upon the reliability of that process or proceeding at
trial."3 9 Wall, 4 ° Sobe141 and other legal scholars" delineate many of
the suggestive influences that apparently pervade lineups and that
render the consequent identification meaningless. As legal scholars
rather consistently acknowledge, we must be more informed about the
psychological facts affecting the lineup experience specifically, and
pretrial confrontations generally, before greater accuracy in the identification of criminal suspects can be achieved.
Such is the goal of this Article. Its primary aim is to detail a number of psychological phenomena observed in other areas of human behavior and hypothesize their probable effects on lineup identifications.
The Wade trilogy provides a useful starting point for discussion not
only because it is a landmark effort to describe some of the factors
which contribute to faulty identification, but also because it suggests,
in a very general way, two possible means for controlling the inherent
dangers-the presence of defense counsel and the development of
new procedures. As a result of our analysis, we hope (1) to delineate
and analyze the variables that affect the accuracy of lineup identifications, (2) to determine to what extent and by what methods these
variables might be controlled, (3) to discuss where further observation
and research are needed, and (4) to assess constitutional and jurisprudential considerations in light of this examination of psychological
variables.
II.

STATUS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

The unreliability of human perception and memory and their
susceptibility to suggestive influence are well documented in psychological and legal literature. We all know from our experience-and
psychologists from their professional training and practice--that peo39 385 U.S. at 239 n.30.
40p. WALL, supra note 12, is descriptive, usually drawing heavily on Borchard and
Wigmore, and discursive, cautioning courts to attend to the noted but never defined
"improper" suggestive procedures in the courtroom, the showup and the lineup. Wall's
attention to the aggravated problem of suggestion in the lineup moves him, using
American as well as European documentation, to outline a preferable procedure. He
speaks highly of the English system and recommends consideration of several measures
including police supervision of witnesses.
41Sobel, supra note 7. See also N. SOBEL, EYE-WIT-Ess IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS (1972). In reviewing various aspects of the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall
holdings, Sobel demonstrates insight into the conditions and consequences of suggestibility
during various stages of criminal identification, including lineups, showups, photo
identifications, and pre- and postconfrontation encounters.
42
See, e.g., J. MiARSHALL, supra note 12; Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home
and Abroad, 11 UTrx L. Rav. 610 (1966); Read, supra note 29; Quinn, supra note 7.
Cf. Protection of the Accused, supra note 29; Comment, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 552 (1955);
Erroneous Eyewitness, supra note 15; Comment, supra note 21.
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ple quite often do not see or hear things which are presented clearly to
their senses, see or hear things which are not there, do not remember
things which have happened to them, and remember things which did
not happen.43 Historically Thucydides4" recognized the problem when
he despairingly noted a "want of coincidence between accounts of the
same occurrences by different eyewitnesses, arising sometimes from
imperfect memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or
the other." And recently the lawyer-novelist Erle Stanley Gardner4"
reported an empirical test of the inability of even trained, experienced
state police officers to estimate accurately height, weight and age. The
respective variations were five inches, twenty pounds and fifteen years.
[A]nd it is to be remembered that these descriptions were
furnished not by men who were excited because they were
being held up, or by men who were getting a fleeting glimpse
of an individual in a dim light-they were sitting there looking directly at [the subject] . . . and they were trained

observers, men who made it their business to classify and
describe."
An examination of the legal psychology literature discloses that
some work has been done demonstrating the unreliability of eyewitness perception; in fact, the psychology of testimony was one of
the earliest areas of applied psychological research. But most of the
studies occurred before the middle of this century, and, although most
of them alluded to suggestive effects in the courtroom context, little
reference was made to parallel effects in pretrial identifications. Unfortunately neither the effects of perception nor those of the courtroom on
witness behavior were actively pursued.
In sum, our survey of past research applied specifically to legal
settings and of research on other phenomena germane to the administration of justice reveals no scientific analyses of police lineups, but a
substantial and promising amount of sophisticated and relevant psychological work in such areas as social perception, group behavior and
values. Although from legal psychology there is some scientific knowledge about the psychology of testimony, such as the function of memory on witness behavior in the courtroom, there is no information
about the behavior of the witness in the pretrial or police lineup con43For one sophisticated account of examples of these phenomena, see Kubie,
Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA. L.
R v. 59 (1959).
44

TnucYDis, CoMPLETE WRITNGs bk. 1 (Modern Library ed. 1951).
supra note 13, at 81-82. See also Gardner, Need for New Concepts

45 E. G ARN_,

in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 50 J. CRmi. L.C. & P.S. 20 (1959).
46E. GAiDua, supra note 13, at 82.
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text. Therefore, we shall have to draw inferences about the dynamics
of pretrial identification from the available evidence that is relevant
and transferable to, but not directly derived from, lineups. The nature
of these data may limit the scope, applicability and validity of the conclusions we can draw, and it makes all of our findings susceptible to
refinement and modification on the basis of later empirical research on
the psychology of eyewitness identification. However, the present
status of psychological knowledge is sufficiently developed to permit
some recommendations about identification procedures and suggest
directions regarding how research and reform might most profitably
proceed.
III.

LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY

The facts of human nature, abilities and needs which seem selfevident today were not so evident when the German jurist-criminologist Hans Gross stressed the need for a scientific psychology of testimony in 1911.1 Academic psychologists responded early, inquiring
experimentally into the process of obtaining testimony in order to discern the impact of legal methods on such processes as perception, memory and emotion.48 They investigated the "truth-telling" phenomena
so vital to courtroom operations and provided substantial proof of the
fallibility of human sense perception, the vagaries of recall, and the
unreliability of eyewitness identification.
In Europe and the United States before World War I, there was
great interest in studying experimentally the role of memory, thinking
and emotion processes on witness behavior. Guy Whipple's excellent
summaries" on the unreliability of testimony provided a complete
description of the psychological inquiries into legal procedures during
this period. The initial landmark effort was made in the United States
in 1908 by Hugo Miiunsterberg's On the Witness Stand. Two years
47
Fishman, Some Current Research Needs in the Psychology of Testimony, 13 J.
Soc. Issuas No. 2, at 60, 67 (1957). See also H. GROSS, CRU'UNAL PSYCHOLOGY (4th ed.
M. Kallen transl. 1911).
48 BEITRGE Ztm PSYCHOLOGIE DER AUSSAGE (IV. Stern ed. 1903-06) (hereinafter
cited as BErTRXOE]; A. BnIET, LA SUGGESTIBILnT (1900); H. MNSTERBERG, ON THE
WINEsS STAND (1908); H. Mj7NSTERBERO, PSYCHOLOGY, GENERAL AND APPLIED (1914);
W. STERN, GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY FROM THE PERSONALISTIC STANDPOINT (H. Spoerl transl.
1938); Whipple, The Observer as Reporter: A Survey of the 'Psychology of Testimony,'
6 PSYCH. BuL. 153 (1909).
49
See, e.g., Whipple, supra note 48; Whipple, Recent Literature on the Psychology of
Testimony, 7 PSYCH. BuLL. 365 (1910). Whipple's extensive review of the experiments
of Varendonck (wherein psychologists gave expert testimony and conducted experiments
on the form of questioning) is particularly valuable. See Whipple, Book Review, 4
J. Cam. L. & C. 150 (1913). Whipple also authored a series of annual reviews on
testimony between 1911 and 1917, e.g., Whipple, Psychology of Testimony, 14 PsYCHr.
BuLL. 234 (1917).
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after Freud counseled lawyers to use psychologists in ascertaining
truth in courts of law, ° Miinsterberg was one of the first psychologists
to elucidate the discrepancies between the evidence of the senses and
the evidence of the law.5 1 He also noted some deficiencies in trial procedures, argued for legal reforms based on scientific experimentation,
and advocated that psychologists help in distinguishing reliable from
unreliable evidence.5" Miinsterberg's passionate interest in applying
psychology to practical courtroom problems produced a series of classroom demonstrations and experiments illustrating that trained observers with generous advance warnings immediately disagreed on
such "structural" sensory events as the pitch of a sound, the color of
disks and the shape of an inkblot.5" Years later McGehee" again established experimentally the unreliability of auditory recognition,
noting that correct recognition varied from eighty-five percent a day
later to fifty-one percent in three weeks and fifteen percent in five
months.
Among the early pioneers two others stand out-Alfred Binet and
Wilhelm Stern. Binet55 developed the "description-of-pictures test" to
investigate scientifically pictorial fidelity. On both adult and children
samples, a complex picture was shown and two minutes later subjects
were asked to write ten-minute descriptions from memory with and
without additional observation. Binet concluded that the nature of the
child or adult more than that of the objects was the most important
criterion in determining report selection. When additional observation
was permitted, reports were only slightly longer and more detailed.55
This reporting ability still constitutes part of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test, suggesting a relationship among recognition ability, intelligence and accurate reporting.
Stern's classic work" in the field of testimony, using picture tests
50 S.FRmU,

Psycho-analysis and the Ascertaining of Truth in Courts of Law (1906),
(J. Riviere transl. 1953).
51 H. M ST=EaG, ON TIM WITNESS STAND (1908).
52
These positions are not unlike those recently advocated by psychologist Donald
Campbell. See, e.g., Campbell, Legal Reforms as Experiments, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 217 (1971).
Appreciation of an experimental approach is also pervasive in contemporary writings by
lawyers. See, e.g., J. MARSHrALL, supra note 12; P. WALL,supra note 12; Murray, supra
note 42; Read, supra note 29.
53 H. M-ONSTERBERG, supra note 51, at 21-31.
54 McGehee, The Reliability of the Identification of the Human Voice, 17 J. GEN.
in 2

CoLLECTE

PAPERs 13

PsYcH. 249 (1937).
55 . PETERsox,

EArLY CoNCEPTIoNs AND TESTS OF INTELLIGENCE 126-32 (1925);
A. Binet, Description d'un Objet, 3 L'ANNLE PSYCHOLOGIQIJE 296-332 (1897). Peterson
gives a full report of Binet's work on description-of-objects and description-of-pictures
tests as well as tests of suggestibility. See also A. BINET, supra note 48.
56J.PETERsO, supra note 55, at 131-32.
57]BEITRXC, supra note 48. W. STEM, supra note 48, was a vital contribution
toward understanding the impact of psychological processes on legal inquiry.
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but adding reality experiments (also known as event tests), resulted in
reforms in German law on the admissibility of evidence. His experiments, demonstrating the unreliability of recall for unexpected events,
have become the paradigm for subsequent experimental studies of
eyewitness reporting by both psychologists and lawyers. 5 In Stern's
reality experiment, subjects witnessed a close-to-life incident, unaware
that it was carefully rehearsed, and then were asked to describe the
events in detail. A typical incident involved two stooges in a scientific
seminar arguing, drawing a gun, threatening to shoot, and then fleeing.
Stern used two methods to test the subjects' ability to report: the
narrative or free account, presumably unaffected by suggestive influences in the setting, and the interrogatory or cross-examination, presumably affected by the dangers of suggestion. He reported not only
on the initial distortions of the original event, but also on the suggestive
effects of the cross-examination-and, by implication, of directive
questioning in the courtroom and lineup contexts.
The attractiveness and utility of the "reality" experiment paradigm is apparent in Kobler's study of a legal society meeting. 9 Kobler
prearranged a threatening, caustic quarrel between two audience members. Several weeks later two court panels--one of three psychologists
and one of three judges-were examined; the results from both groups
were similarly condensed, simplified and somewhat distorted. Kobler
concluded that excitement and emotion affect observation, and that
witness agreement may mean coincident erroneous testimony. Subsequent research supported his points. Illustratively, Beier's experiment"0
disclosed that anxiety caused a loss of abstract abilities generally and,
more specifically, a loss of flexibility in intellectual function and visual
coordination. Evidently there is a disparity between psychological
and legal doctrine on the accuracy of testimony and identification under
emotional stress-as exemplified by the spontaneous exclamation exception to the hearsay rule."
After World War I, the legally-trained psychologist William
Marston 2 attempted to meet criticisms directed at earlier investigators
58 F. BERRIEN, PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1946); H. BURTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1931); H. Buarr, APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY (1st ed. 1948); J. MARSHALL, supra note 12;
Berrien, Psychology and the Court, in PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAw EN-rFORCEIMENT OFICIALS
202 (G. Dudycha ed. 1955).
59Reviewed in Whipple, Psychology of Testimony, 12 PSYCH. BuLL. 221 (1915).
6E. BETm-, THE EFCT Or I-DucED AIx
Y ON FLExmIiTY oF INTELLECTuAL
FUNCTIONIG (Psych. Monographs No. 326, 1952).
G1The spontaneous exclamation exception generally holds that certain statements
made under stress are sincere because such a circumstance precludes the operation of
reflective faculties. See 6 J. WiGMORE, EviDENcE §§ 1745 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
62Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. CRm. L. & C. 5 (1924); Rouke, Psychological Research on Problens of Testimony, 13 J. Soc. IssuEs No. 2, at 50, 57 (1957).
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here and abroad. Using Stern's paradigmatic event test,6 3 he employed
a judge as the factfinder and an experienced lawyer with a jury of men
and a jury of women to analyze the testimony. The results established
that of the various methods for eliciting testimony, free narration was
less complete and more accurate than direct or cross-examination; direct examination was both more complete and more accurate than crossexamination; and cross-examination's only advantage was in being
more complete than free narration. Consistent with Kobler's findings,
the study also indicated that, while the judge was better able to give
complete testimony than the jury, even he had a considerable margin
of error. Other psychological features of the trial process were also
subjected to systematic, joint inquiry by the lawyer Robert Hutchins
and the psychologist Donald Slesinger. 5 In a series of articles, they reviewed legal rules of evidence in terms of psychological findings on
perception, memory and emotion, ultimately arguing for more interdisciplinary experimentation and application. Likewise, the very excellent integrative review of the lawyer Dillard Gardner called for further
exploration ° and experimentation to permit better evaluation of witness
testimony2 l
Treatises on legal psychology of over thirty years ago, such as
Burtt's6 7 and McCarty's,63 also contained information on behavioral
processes as applied to the trial context. Miinsterberg's precocious
advocacy of applying "every chapter and subchapter of sense psychology"" was amplified in both of Burtt's texts which dealt with data
related to sensory defects, distance perception, color vision, time perception, intelligence, attention, stress and suggestion. In each instance
43 BEITRXGE,

supra note 48.

6

4 The judge was John Wigmore; the jurors, college students.

65
See, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence:
Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 432 (1928); Hutchins & Slesinger,
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 HARv. L. Rlv. 860 (1928);
Hutchins & Slesinger, Legal Psychology, 36 PsYcH. REv. 13 (1929).
66 Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CoRNELL L.Q. 391 (1933).
Gardner concluded his article with the following, at 409.
This study of memory has indicated to trial lawyers that faulty memory may
be attacked most effectively along three distinct lines: (1) The original perception of the event or detail may have been defective; (2) the details may not
have been fixated, may have been forgotten, or imagination may have altered,
added to, or changed them; (3) the original perception may have become interwoven with or altered by suggestion from outside sources. Tests directed at the
perception of the witness, his retentiveness, imagination, caution, bias, and suggestibility will be most fruitful. The important questions to consider concerning
his memory are: Did he perceive as he now recalls it? Has his memory retained,
without addition or subtraction, the original perception? Does imagination,
bias or suggestion color his present recollection?
67 H. BuRTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY (1931).
68D. McCARTY, PSYcHOLOGY FoR TH LAWYER (1929).
69 H. MZINSTERBERG, supra note 51, at 33.
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Burtt tried to show that information possessed by psychologists about
natural human processes and human interactions could be brought to
bear on discrepancies in testimony. Verifying scientifically the general
unreliability of testifying and identifying in legal and academic settings, he systematically described numerous structural conditions
affecting perception and memory. For example, about four percent of
the male and one percent of the female population are color blind;
the absorbable number of simultaneous impressions is limited so that
in one-tenth of a second most people read four or five digits and fail
with nine; and set, or initial cuing, results in witnesses giving better
descriptions.70 Burtt also reported that the expectative and implicative
forms of questioning elicited more wrong responses than straightforward questions, that the objective form was more suggestive than
the subjective form, and that double negatives introduced confusion
and inaccuracy. 71 And, consistent with Kobler's conclusions, Burtt's
experiment in a seminar on crime demonstrated that stress was a dis72
organizing condition operating against effective recall.
In 1955, Berrien7 3 revived interest in the field with a short, but
well-presented, article, Psychology and the Court. In this piece he
emphasized the psychological evidence on the creative, selective aspects of testimony (observers fill in details to conform to their meaning
of an event) and again took issue with the legal doctrine on exclamations by maintaining that excitement blurs accuracy and subsequent
reporting. Although in a cursory manner, Berrien emphasized that the
"[s]pecial aspects of identifying persons in a line-up ' ' demand attention. While over fifteen years have gone by, a research response
from psychology has not been forthcoming-though in 1960 McCarty
75
reissued a slightly revised version of his 1929 volume..
As noted above,76 the legal profession is also concerned about
lineup identification problems, but in the current works of lawyers, for
70
H. BuRar, APPLiD PSYCHOLOGY 292-301 (1948). Initial cuing consists of advising
a subject that an event which he should concentrate on is upcoming. Thus, Burtt gives
the example of a starter at a track meet saying "get set" so that the runners will concentrate on and perceive earlier the firing of the starting gun. Id. 301.
71
An "expectative" type question tends to expect a positive answer: "Was there a
cat in the picture?" An "implicative" question asks "What color was the cat?" when
there was no cat. A "subjective" question is personalized and contains the word "you,"
while an "objective" question involves no personal pronouns. For further amplification
of these definitions and the experimental findings, see H. Bunrrr, supra note 67, at 119-31.
72 Id. 71-76. See also text accompanying note 59 supra.
73
Berrien, supra note 58.

74 Id. 214.

75
D. McCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY AND TiE LAW (1960) ;
7

6See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.

cf. D. McCARTY, supra note 68.
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example Wall7l and Marshall,7 8 no experimental research is extensively
described or undertaken. Wall's book, written for the practitioner,
builds primarily on legal documents and draws little on cited scientific
sources, though it depicts various psychological conditions of suggestibility. The Marshall book, focusing on the activities of the lawyer and the
trial process, represents an admirable attempt to apply recent psychological studies to problems of recall for purposes of giving testimony,
to conduct interdisciplinary research on unreliable eyewitness perceptions, and to call for a more stringent utilization of psychological findings "which apply directly to and challenge the precepts and practices
of our courts.17 Using a movie of an alleged kidnapping in an experimental study of selective recall, Marshall found that the recall of lower
social class subjects was less accurate, that police trainees reported a
greater number of nonexistent events, and that person-not actionitems were least frequently recalled. Marshall correctly acknowledged
the "selective process" and the "inventive reconstruction" of perception in all environments and stressed the need to attend to the "betting"
predilections in witness behavior in classroom, courtroom and lineup
situations.8 However, in his own interdisciplinary excursions Marshall
extrapolated primarily to the courtroom, not the lineup.
In a recent experiment" Marshall and his associates, Kent Marquis and Stuart Oskamp, dealt further with the psychology of testimony. 3 In an effort to determine the effects of different kinds of interrogation on the reliability of testimony, they showed a short film of an
automobile accident followed by a scuffle. All subjects gave a free
report, then each was questioned by several interrogation methods. 4
WALL, supra note 12.
J. MARSHALL, supra note 12.
79 Id. 103.
80
Id. 52-58.
81 Id. 9-22. In short, there is always "disparity between even the simplest stimulus
...and the perception of it." Id. 9. Thus perception is a reconstruction. "Filling gaps in
perception is a betting process. We select what we believe will be harmonious with those
elements we have perceived .... The elements that we choose or repress will depend on
what bet, or what selection, we make as the likeliest explanation for what we see ...."
Id. 19 (footnote omitted). For further reference regarding Marshall's orientation, see
EXPLORATIONS ix TRANSACTIONAL PSYCHOLOoY (F. Kilpatrick ed. 1961).
82 Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, Effects of Kind of Question and Atmosphere of
77 P.
78

Interrogation on Accuracy and Completeness of Testimony, 84 HAav. L. Rav. 1620
(1971).
83 Other contemporary collaborative attempts by law and psychology continue to
emphasize the courtroom setting as a paradigm for testing psychological hypotheses.
See Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking,
86 HAav. L. Rv. 386 (1972); Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of Presentation at
Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216 (1972). A recent book focuses on witness reliability by aiming
to introduce a technology for the assessment and interpretation of witness statements.
A. TRANKELL, RELABILITY or EVIDENCE (1972).
84 Specifically, the investigators used four types of questions which were related
in varying degrees to the methods used in court to elicit testimony. Marshall, Marquis &
Oskamp, supra note 82, at 1624-26.
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Although accuracy was slightly higher with spontaneous report, the
completeness of the testimony increased much more than accuracy
decreased under all conditions of interrogation. In other words, all
forms of questioning produced a larger body of information than did
free account. But considering our focus on criminal identification, it is
worth noting that, while interrogation was only slightly less accurate
than free recall for action, sound and object content, there was a substantial disparity in index scores for person content. Nevertheless, this
experiment suggests that the effects of interrogation upon the reliability of testimony are not uniformly negative. When we add to this the
well-documented psychological commonplace that, under most circumstances, recognition memory is superior to recall,8" we have another
reason not to be totally pessimistic regarding lineup identifications.
IV.

HUMAN LIMITATIONS ON IDENTIFICATION

A.

Perception and Memory

The evidence gathered by these experiments in legal psychology
demonstrates beyond doubt the unreliability of perception and memory, phenomena of which none of us is without some personal knowledge. Perception and memory are fallible. But why are they fallible,
both in general and in this specific context?
Experimental psychologists agree that perception depends to a
great extent on what is already in the mind of the perceiver: one
learns to perceive, and one learns to perceive selectively. 6 Perceptual
processes involve first organizing discrete elements of a situation into
meaningful categories. As Jerome Bruner observed, accurate perception "consists of the coding of stimulus inputs in appropriate
categories." 87 Presumably the preexisting categories will vary in
appropriateness among different individuals. Learning to perceive, like
all learning, is accompanied by the danger of serious error. For example, if the categories developed for judging age and size (two variables
obviously important in the present context) are faulty and incomplete,
then the age and size of a particular stimulus input is likely to be
misjudged.
85

See, e.g., J. AnAms, HatAN ME2mXORY (1967); C. LU', THE CoNDrnONs or
RETENTION (Psych. Monographs No. 142, 1922).
S See, e.g., Gibson, The Theory of Information Pickup, in CONTEMPORARY THEORY
AND RESEARCH ne VISUAL PERCEPTION 662 (R. Haber ed. 1968); Treisman & Geffen,
Selective Attention: Perception or Response?, in IwroRWATION-PROcSSING APPROACHES
TO VIsUAL PERCEPTION 373 (R. Haber ed. 1969).
87
Bruner, On Perceptual Readiness, in Coxr= .ionxY T7HEoRz AND REsEARCH IN
VISUAL PERCEPTION 634 (R. Haber ed. 1968). See also J. BRUNER, J. GooDnrow &
G. AUsTIN, A STnDY or TmI
oG (1956); Bruner, Social Psychology and Perception,
in READiNGs IN SOCIAL PsYCHoLoGY 85 (3d ed. E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb & E. Hartley

1958).
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Perception is incomplete as well as inaccurate. As Burtt's investigations showed, 88 the absorbable number of simultaneous perceptions
is limited; people can perceive only so much at one time and can code
even less. Perception is further limited and often distorted by the
vantage point of the particular observer, the intervening stimulus inputs between the observer and the salient stimuli, or the structure of
the salient stimuli. The well-known Miiller-Lyer illusion on judgments
of the relative length of lines is a classic example of this latter phenomenon. 9 Two lines of equal length bound by arrows in opposite
directions (inward or outward) create the false perception that the
lines are of unequal length. In other words, what one perceives does
not always correspond with what is before one-a phenomenon important to consider in evaluating eyewitness perception.
B.

Perceptual Selectivity

The selectivity of perceptual processes poses another problem.
Perceiving or "experiencing" the physical world in and of itself is an
event: "It is not a substance that comes and goes with opening and
closing of the eyes." ' 0 As Gibson and other psychologists have pointed
out, we develop what may be called economical perception, the ability
"to concentrate on one thing at a time in the face of everything going
on in the environment," so that "the information registered about objects and events becomes only what is needed, not all that could be
obtained."'- In short, only a number of simultaneous impressions can
be grasped. "For the abiding fact about the process of knowing, of
which perceiving is one aspect, is that organisms have a highly limited
span of attention and a highly limited span of immediate memory.
Selectivity is forced upon us by the nature of these limitations .... .I
In concentrating on what presently appears to be the most important event or aspect of a particular event, the perceiver may fail to
note, or absorb only below the level of consciousness, other aspects or
events which may be more significant in another context. Even leaving
aside for the moment emotional factors which may distort perception,
a witness to or victim of a crime may well concentrate, for instance,
on stimuli relevant to his or her chances of escaping rather than on
stimuli concerning the appearance of the criminal. Alternatively, the
88
89

H. BURTT, supra note 67.
For a full explanation and illustration of this illusion, see N. MvUN,
501-02 (5th ed. 1966).
90P. YoUmG, MoTIVAiON AND EmonoiN 300 (1961).
91 Gibson, supra note 86, at 677.
92 Bruner, Social Psychology and Perception, supra note 87, at 86.

PSYCHOLOGY

19731

PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION

1097

victim may ."escape" by trying psychologically to be somewhere else;
that is, by absorbing and coding as little information about the unpleasant situation as possible. This phenomenon is termed "perceptual
defense."9 3 Even if neither of these alternatives occurs, there is no
evidence that witnesses will unerringly pick out the most important
stimulus inputs for subsequent identification and concentrate on coding
those. Although Marshall, Marquis and Oskamp did find some greater
completeness in reporting legally relevant material, there was no difference in the accuracy of the legally relevant and nonrelevant 4
C.

PerceptualReadiness and Stress

The potential for error in perception due to inaccuracies and
illusions is important to keep in mind. If the witness or victim did not
or cannot under a particular set of circumstances perceive correctly,
then an accurate subsequent identification cannot be expected. On the
other hand, if, for example, the witness has received warning prior to
the actual observation ("Watch that man!"), then there is greater
probability of an accurate identification." A variety of considerations
like novelty, size and interest all may affect one's attention. But witnesses to a crime are further handicapped in accurately estimating
such characteristics as size and age by their very limited opportunity
to observe and their lack of prior knowledge of the criminal.
Generally the more information we have about people, the more
accurate we are likely to be in estimating physical characteristics.
Casual conversation about past experiences is a useful cue to a person's
age, and height and weight can be more easily judged when there is
ample opportunity to compare and contrast the stimulus person to
others of known body type. A relatively brief and isolated encounter,
such as a crime is likely to be, does not give much opportunity for this
sophisticated type of estimation. Illustratively, we can recognize even
a grossly distorted version of an incumbent President of the United
States because he is a common subject for cartoons, we have information about his recent public activities, and we know places where he
might be likely to appear. By the same token, we recognize the
strangers we pass every day on our way to work not only because their
faces look familiar but also because we expect them to be at a particu9

3 The concept was first used by McGinnies in referring to resistance against recognition of "taboo" words as a way of avoiding anxiety. McGinnies, Rnmotionality and
Perceptual Defense, 56 PsYcH. REv. 244 (1949). See also P. YouNG, supra note 90,
at 306-09; Bruner, Social Psychology and Perception, supra note 87, at 90.
94
Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, supra note 82, at 1632.

95 This adjustment is termed an "accommodation of attention." See, e.g., H. BURTr,
supra note 67, at 62.
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lar place at a particular time. If they appear in a new coat or a new
hair style, we continue to recognize them because we see them within
a familiar situational context. The crucial point is that accurate perception and later recognition depend as well on factors of familiarity
and repetition, and a witness to a crime is in a situation particularly
impoverished in those respects.
Problems arising from the unexpectedness and brevity of the
event (reducing perceptual attention and readiness) are only compounded by the fact that a crime is a stressful situation. Research evidence does not provide a simple equation for predicting whether
anxiety will affect perception and memory positively or negatively.
Miinsterberg's findings 0 suggested that moderate stress improved the
accuracy of testimony, whereas great or little stress hurt. Burtt reported that "considerable excitement seems to militate against accurate
observation." 9 7 None of the later studies have cast any doubt on these

conclusions.
Victims of or witnesses to a crime probably suffer anxiety or
stress that affects their ability to perceive and remember. Some
crimes can reasonably be assumed to produce greater anxiety in witnesses than others, and victims generally are more anxious than bystanders at the same crimes. This anxiety may occur less in cases
where the witness does not know he or she is seeing a crime, as is the
case with a confidence game, or a situation where a child gets into a
car which proves to be that of a kidnapper. In such instances, the effects of anxiety will operate retroactively only. But there is a large
gray area where it would be far more difficult to rank the degree of
stress people are likely to suffer, where reaction would depend on
subtle factors such as the importance of the victim to the witness, the
perceiver's emotional idiosyncracies, and a host of other variables.
Further, the lineup or showup itself may be anxiety-arousing.
And unfortunately, in an anxiety-arousing situation there may be
increased intolerance of ambiguity and increased drive for understanding.9" In other words, although under stress the accuracy of an
identification may be reduced, the individual's need for identifying may
be increased. For example, Smock 00 reported that people in stressful
H. Mi NSTERBERG, supra note 51.
H. BRT , supra note 67, at 72. See text accompanying notes 59, 72 supra.
98See studies cited in Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, supra note 82, at 1634 nn. 15,
90
9

17.

99
Berkowitz, Social Motivation, in 3 HANDBOOK or SociL PsYCHOLOGY 89 (2d ed.
G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 1969).
100 Smock, The Influence of Psychological Stress on the "Intolerance of Ambiguity,"
50 J. ABNoRm. & Soc. PsYcH. 177 (1955).
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situations were quicker to categorize ambiguous stimuli. Bruner well
summed up the difficulty: "C[U]nder stress conditions or under conditions of exigent motivation... the likelihood of erroneous perception
increases."""° Thus, it is particularly crucial to tailor investigatory approaches (including when they are held) with witnesses in ways reflective of the potential impact of stress. As Marshall, Marquis and
Oskamp concluded in tackling the effect of stress on testimony:
"Further experimental inquiry along these lines might be of great use
in evaluating and improving the process of courtroom examination"'
-likewise criminal identification.
D. Memory
As noted above, the accuracy of memory depends in part upon the
accuracy of perception. Although remembering and thinking are cognitive processes, they rest upon perception. Therefore, to the extent
that one perceives incorrectly what happens, remembering will be incorrect. But there are other processes involved in memory which add
to the possibility of inaccuracy, even when initial perception is correct
and complete.
There are three basic psychological theories pertaining to memory.
While they are incompatible with one another in many areas, they
tend to account for the fallibility of memory in somewhat similar, or
at least noncontradictory, ways. Learning theorists have evolved a
conception of memory as an active, ongoing process which modifies
experience rather than simply registering it.0 3 Gestalt psychologists,
relying more heavily on unconscious processes, have conceptualized "a
continuous subconscious activity of a memory trace, with the whole
continually exerting its unifying pressure on the parts, and the parts
conforming better and better to the general part of the whole."' 4 Implicit in both of these conceptions is the possibility that the "whole"
which modifies experience may also distort it. Memory may be rendered inaccurate, then, by processes and forces similar to those that
distort perception.
The psychoanalytic approach to memory heavily emphasizes un101 Bruner, Social Psychology and Perception, supra note 87, at 91.
0
1 2 Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, supra note 82, at 1634.
103 For a review of conceptions of memory, see J. ADAMS, supra note 85; J.
McGEocHr, THE PSYCH1OLOGY OF Hum,- LEARuir (A. Irion ed. 1952); Hovland,
Human Learning and Retention, in HANDBOOK oF EXPERP ENTAL PSYC OLOGY (S.Stevens
ed. 1951); Redmount, The Psychological Basis of Evidence Practices: Memory, 50
J. Cimi. L.C. & P.S. 244 (1959).
10
4Redmount, supra note 103, at 254. See also D. KATZ, GSTALT PSYCHOLOGY ch. 20
(1950); K. KOFFEKA, PRxNcipLEs or GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY chs. 10-11 (1935); W. K61HLER,
GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY chs. 4, 8-9 (1947).
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conscious processes and emotional factors. Freud established that forgetting was a phenomenon of motivation. Later investigators gathered
evidence which supported his conclusion that events associated with
unpleasant emotions are forgotten. 0 5 While mildly affective experiences, either positive or negative, are remembered better than neutral
experiences, with more pronounced trauma the effect is reversed. This
finding is clearly of great significance for identification of criminal
suspects. Although one cannot accept without qualification the argument that emotional strain distorts memory, surely it can and frequently does.' 0 6
A central factor affecting memory is the phenomenon technically
called retroactive inhibition. Retroactive inhibition or RI consists not
so much of decay as of "the interference, inhibition or obliteration of
the old by the new."'0 7 With the passage of time, new learning is interpolated between the old memory and the effort for recall. These intervening impressions reduce the salience of the memory and inhibit
completeness and accuracy. 0 8 Empirical evidence leaves no doubt that
RI is an extremely powerful force, 109 especially with material of little
importance to the subject. Further, any advantage for reducing retroactive inhibition which might be gained from the fact that stimulus
inputs surrounding a crime are likely to be very important for the
subject is quite probably counteracted by the need to forget unpleasant
material. Thus, as a general rule, interpolated events and materials
are likely to interfere with retention.
In a classic experiment on remembering nonsense syllables Ebbinghaus" ° discovered a "curve of forgetting," along which forgetting
is initially rapid (within the first half hour) and then becomes more
and more gradual. This general trend has been confirmed in subsequent
research. The data on recognition memory-and eyewitness identifi105 S. FREUD, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY Or EVERYDAY LirE (2d ed. A. Brill transl.
1948); Redmount, supra note 103, at 255; Zeller, An Experimental Analogue of Repression. I. The Effect of Individual Failure and Success on Memory Measured by Relearning, 40 J. ExPER. PSYCH. 411 (1950).
0
' 6See Kubie, supra note 43. One source of abundant evidence on the distorting
effects of stress on perception and memory is the WARREN COMIIssION REPORT ON THE
ASSASSiNATION

OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY (Bantam ed. 1964).

107 Redmount, supra note 103, at 253-54. For a detailed experimental example,
see Jenkins & Dallenbach, Obliviscence during Sleep and Waking, 35 Am. J. PSYCH. 605,
612 (1924).
108 See J. ADAMS, supra note 85, chs. 3-4; J. McGEOCH, supra note 103; Redmount,
supra
note 103.
109
For an excellent review of research on retroactive inhibition, see J. ADAMS,

supra note 85, at 258-62. See also Redmount, supra note 103, at 253-54.
11OH. EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY: A CONTRInUON To EXPE&ENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
(H. Ruger & C. Bessenius transl. 1913). For a summary of Ebbinghaus' experiments
and other research generally verifying the forgetting curve, see N. MUNN,supra note 89,
at 387.
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cation is one instance-also show that retention weakens over time,
although the curve of forgetting does not appear to be initially as
steep. While, as we have indicated, recognition is generally superior to
recall, it is far from perfect. Bahrick and Bahrick"' found that recognition remained high after two hours, but deteriorated markedly after
two weeks. Shepard" 2 tested for recognition of pictures after intervals
of two hours and three, seven and 120 days and found respective
median percent retentions of 100, ninety-three, ninety-two, and fiftyseven. These findings confirmed the pattern of forgetting obtained years
before by Strong,"' who discovered that even with stimuli subjects
knew they had seen before, recognition dropped to zero after forty-two
days." 4 These data, incidentally, indicate that the police practice of
holding on-the-scene showups if at all possible within an hour or two
after the crime is psychologically sound, at least as far as memory is
concerned. Likewise, the more astute of the legal commentators seemed
to criticize the use of showup practices as a standard procedure on this
basis: "Fresh memory [as a justification for showups] may be valid
when the pretrial identification occurred within a few hours of the
crime, but when that identification did not occur until days after the
crime, little validity can be found in the argument."' " 5
E. Differences in Perceptual and Mnemonic Ability
Various diverse factors may affect visual perception. For example, a nearsighted person has reduced ability to discern distant objects,
the amount of illumination (daylight clear visibility is forty or fifty
yards as compared to ten or eleven yards in moonlight) affects perception, and visual efficiency is dependent on adaptation (improved
vision after adaptation to bright sunlight or darkness).l" Furthermore,
individual witnesses may vary in acuity of observation and reliability
and completeness of memory. Ralph Exine"7 found significant sex
differences in person perception. Female subjects, significantly more
than males, focused on those with whom they interacted, and re111 Bahrick & Bahrick, A Re-examination of the Interrelations among Measures of
Retention, 16 Q.J. Exv.-PsYCH. 318 (1964).
112 Shepherd, Recognition Memory for Words, Sentences, and Pictures, 6 J. VERB.
LEARxmG & VERB. BnA~v. 156 (1967).
113 Strong, The Effect of Time Interval upon Recognition Memory, 20 PsYcH. REY.
339 (1913).
114 Studies cited notes 111-13 supra, reviewed in J. ADAMS, supra note 85, ch. 9.
115 PretrialIdentification, supra note 5, at 789.
116H. BuRaT, supra note 67, at 16-24; H. BuaRr, supra note 70, at 292-94.
117 Exine, Exploration in the Process of Person Perception: Visual Interaction in
1 (1963).
Relation to Competition, Sex, and Need for Affiliation, 31 J. PERsoNAsrvi
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lied upon visual cues. Shrauger and Altrocchi 118 suggested that men
tended to concentrate on physical characteristics such as clothing or
size, while women were more likely to emphasize inferred psychological characteristics. However, this conclusion must be qualified because
the differences seemed to depend on the sorts of people described and
the aggressive or passive tendencies of the perceiver. These two studies
taken together suggest that, while women absorb more physical information than do men, they may be more apt to code this information in
terms of psychological inferences. If this conclusion is valid, there is
no reason to expect women to yield a higher proportion of accurate
lineup identifications. Research testing the sex of the witness (matched
for the sex of the lineup participants) would be illuminating in this
regard both for law and psychology.19
Age, too, may make a considerable difference. Two Australian investigators 20 found that people over sixty were significantly inferior
to those between fifteen and forty-five in both recall and recognition.
Memory theorists suggest that the years of greatest development are
from three to seven, and that there is significant major growth until
about fourteen when a mature level is achieved. 2' Closely related to
the issue of age is the relationship between intelligence, if not education, and accurate identification. The Shrauger and Altrocchi essay'22
supports the relationship between intelligence, recognition ability, and
accurate reporting suggested by the Stanford-Binet Intelligence
Test." Research on intelligence generally indicates a high correlation
between mental functioning and memory. 24 While legal commentators
acknowledge this relationship, they simultaneously maintain that those
of lower intelligence, though perhaps more limited perceptually, may
be more focused and thus no less accurate.' 25 Furthermore, the historical findings of such investigators as Kobler and Marston 126 importantly question the accuracy of the observations and recall of even the
118 Shrauger & Altrocchi, The Personality of the Perceiver as a Factor in Person
Perception, 62 PsYcH. BtrLL. 289, 297-98 (1964).
119The authors conducted informal interviews with police officers from a major
metropolitan police department in March, 1971. While these officers' opinions may be
idiosyncratic, they tended to prefer female to male witnesses. They also seemed to feel
that educated people remembered better, and that young people made better witnesses
than old.
120 Harwood & Naylor, Recall and Recognition in Elderly and Young Subjects,
21 AuST. J.PsYcHr. 251 (1969).
121 See Redmount, supra note 103, at 256.
122 Shrauger & Altrocchi, supra note 118. See also J. MARsA,
supra note 12,
at 42-43.
123 See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
124 Redmount, supra note 103, at 256.
125F. BERRMI, supra note 58, at 427; D. McCARTY, supra note 75, at 192-93.
126 See Marston, supra note 62; Whipple, supra note 59.
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best educated, presumably highly intelligent witnesses. While little
can be done about individual limitations of sense perception and
memory, criminal identification processes must be able to detect limitations when they exist, and both legal professionals and laymen must
be educated about them.
V.

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY OF IDENTIFICATION

The foregoing review of theory and research on memory and perception suggests why the potential for error is so great. Valid identification is necessarily restricted by human capacity. The observation
that eyewitness identification is potentially fraught with error is supported by findings extracted from psychological investigations. But
this review does not account for all of the possibilities for error in perception and memory even in everyday life. These studies were limited
in scope to the extent they isolated the individual subject for studying
sensory processes. They did not attempt sufficiently to emphasize the
social context of perception. Since the criminal identification process
necessarily involves an interaction between sensory and social inputs,
it may properly be analyzed in social psychological terms, by considering such influences as the motivational nature of perception, the impact
of group structure, the pressure of prejudice, the force of witness
personality and the potency of authority and prestige.
Although past research indicates that knowing the power of sensory effects on eyewitness identification is crucial, even more significant
for identifying the critical aspects of the lineup is assessing the directive weight of social psychological influences on that process. In
contrast to classical work in perception, which focused on innate
mechanisms, contemporary trends-called the "New Look" in perception-emphasize the impact of such variables as needs, social
values, expectancies and cultural background on perceptual organization.'2 7 Henri Tajfel's excellent contemporary review of social and
cultural factors 2 " underscores the preeminent importance of the social
context of perception. Similarly Floyd Allport's earlier, comprehensive
analysis on the theories of perception 129 also emphasizes the interactive
127 Bruner, Social Psychology and Perception, supra note 87, at 88.
12
8 Tajfel, Social and Cultural Factors in Perception,in 3 TaIE HANDBoo OF SocIA
PSYCHOLOGY 315 (2d ed. G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 1969). For an excellent example of

a research study on cultural effects, see M. SEGALL, D. CAwBPEELL & M. HEasxovn-z,
THEmINrLnvNcE or CUrT=

oN VIsuAL PERCEPTION (1966). These investigators reach
the important conclusion that "[tihe findings we have reported, and the findings of
others we have reviewed, point to the conclusion that to a substantial extent we learn
to perceive; that in spite of the phenomenally absolute character of our perceptions,
they are determined by perceptual inference habits; and that various inference habits
are differentially
likely in different societies.' Id. 214.
129 F. ALEPORT, THEORIES OF PERCEPTION AND THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE (1955).
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relationship between sensory (structural) and social (functional) inputs on perceptual reporting. An appreciation of this perspective informs
our approach.
A.

Emotional State

Explorations in the process of person perception"' disclose that
the significance of an object or an event to the viewer, including its
emotional significance, deeply affects the manner in which it is perceived. In summarizing person perception research, Ittelson and
Slack'" ' noted the difficulty in separating the effects of familiarity
from those of emotional significance, a problem compounded by the
fact that "important" people receive greater perceptual attention and
thus tend to be more "familiar." In three studies Wittreich and Radcliffe'3 2 measured the amounts of perceptual distortion experienced by
married couples in viewing their spouses and strangers, by Navy recruits in viewing authority and nonauthority figures, and by subjects
viewing amputees and physically intact strangers. Spouses, authority
figures, and amputees were significantly less distorted. Since in the "authority" experiment the subjects reported after removal of the stimuli
from their presence, and in the "mutilation" experiment the amputees
were unknown to the subjects, the resistance to distortion seems related to the emotional significance, not familiarity, of the object. Other
work on perception by Asthana 3 3 featured subjects using aniseikonic
lenses' 3 4 to view a liked person (A), a disliked person (B), a stranger
(C), physical objects (D), and the self-image in a mirror (E). In this
experiment the amount of experienced distortion ranked from most to
least was B, D, C, A and E. Thus, positive emotional significance appeared to be crucial in offsetting or resisting perceptual distortion.
30As defined by Tagiuri, Person Perception, in 3 T~n HANDBoox op SoCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 395 (2d ed. G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 1969), "Person perception refers to the
processes by which man comes to know and to think about other persons, their characteristics, qualities, and inner states. . . . As a physical object, a person is not basically
different from other physical stimuli." Thus, the field of person perception covers a wide
range of phenomena from physical characteristics to complex inferences about personality
traits.
131 Ittelson & Slack, The Perception of Persons as Visual Objects, in PERS N PERCEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR (R. Tagiuri & L. Petrullo eds. 1958).

132Wittreich, The Honi Phenomenon: A Case of Selective Perceptual Distortion,
& Soc. Psycr. 705 (1952); Wittreich & Radcliffe, Differences in the
Perception of an Authority Figure and a Non-Authority Figure by Navy Recruits,
47 J. AENORM.

53 J. ABNORM. & Soc. PsYcH. 383 (1956); Wittreich & Radcliffe, The Influence of
Simulated Mutilation Upon the Perception of the Human Figure, 51 J.ABxoaiM. & Soc.
PsycH. 493 (1955).
133 Asthana, Perceptual Distortion as a Function of the Valence of Perceived Object,
52 J. Soc. PsYCH:. 119 (1960).
134 Aniseikonic lenses are lenses that induce optical distortions, such that the retinal
images of an object appear to be of unequal size and shape.
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Again untainted perception of both persons and objects, particularly
those that are unfamiliar, seems problematic.
These studies on the perception of physical characteristics of
persons provide an excellent demonstration of the effects of emotions
on perception which warrant consideration in a legal context. Although
these findings can only be considered tentative, distortion may be reduced with stimuli that arouse positive affect or are familiar. A criminal suspect, however, is not likely to fall into either category. But,
beyond suggesting that various emotional factors may operate to affect
the degree of distortion, this literature offers very practical implications for pretrial confrontations. Since systematic bias may relate to
emotions associated with particular persons or objects at the scene of
the crime, it is essential to conduct lineups instead of showups except
in strictly and specifically defined circumstances, and to match lineup
participants with extraordinary care so that these factors are controlled.
B. Motivational State
Many studies in perception have documented the complexity of
the processes by which the viewer selects from the evidence of his
senses. The early memory research of Frederic Bartlett'3 5 isolated
three psychological steps in identification: perception, remembering
and reporting. Using a serial reproduction technique with storytelling
and picture drawing,"3 6 Bartlett demonstrated experimentally that
memory was a constructive, not a reproductive, process, in which
attitudes and expectations played a crucial role. Perceptions were dis1 37
torted as well by leveling, sharpening and assimilating processes,'
135 F. BARLETT, RE E MERING: A SlimY 3N EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1932).
130For example, there would be a progression of pictures in which the form of an
owl changed to that of a cat.
137 Leveling, sharpening and assimilating are the processes involved in the transmission of rumor. See G. ALLPORT & L. PosTmAw, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 75, 86, 99
(1947). See also Allport & Postman, The Basic Psychology of Rumor, in READINGS In
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 58-61 (3d ed. E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb & E. Hartley 1958).
Leveling is the reduction of detail as the rumor is transmitted. Sharpening is the inevitable reciprocal of leveling. It is the bringing into prominence of the remaining details;
"the selective perception, retention, and reporting of a limited number of details from a
larger context." Assimilation is the force accounting for this reception and modification
exerted by one's beliefs, prejudices, values, interests or sentiments. Eyewitness identification-witnessing an event and then recalling it-is comparable in many respects to the
transmission of rumor. Both are susceptible to many of the same causes of inaccuracy.
Thus, some of the methodologies for understanding the nature of rumor should have
utility in educating legal professionals regarding the potential inaccuracy of identification.
See, e.g., J. Tapp, A Technique for Understanding Rumor among Children (1952)
(unpublished Master's thesis in University of Southern California Library); Tapp,
Every Person Adds Something Else . . . "That Aren't Always True," 32 EDUC. SCRFEN
20 (1953).
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as subjects condensed or elaborated to achieve a simpler, more significant configuration congruent with their needs rather than "reality."
Even physical needs affect accurate reporting. McClelland and
Atkinson 3 ' studied 108 men who had not eaten for one, four or sixteen
hours. In one instance, they flashed before subjects vague pictures of
a "hamburger" and "ashtray." Among those who had not eaten in
sixteen hours, seventy-five percent saw the hamburger as larger. In
an experiment by Levine, Chein and Murphy,'3 9 subjects shown
meaningless inkblots more frequently verbalized associating the ambiguous drawings with some type of food three and six hours after
food deprivation, though not after nine. In comparison, a control
group shown the pictures on a series of occasions after eating indicated no trend toward increased food responses. Yet, in a parallel
study by Brozek, Guetzkow and Baldwin,140 conscientious objectors
experienced no increased food associations with deprivation. On the
basis of these studies, Bruner concluded that "there is now enough
evidence before us to suggest that not the amount of need but the way
in which a person learns to handle his needs determines the manner in
41
which motivation and cognitive selectivity will interact."
In addition to physiological needs, psychological motives can be
particularly powerful and may have a considerable influence on identification accuracy. Shrauger and Altrocchi 4 2 found that person perception was affected significantly by the personality needs of the
perceiver in ways that varied with the status of the stimulus person.
For example, authoritarians described their peers more favorably than
nonauthoritarians, but with strangers the effect was reversed-suggesting that authoritarian intolerance for ambiguity may have resulted
in response rigidity. 43 Similarly, a great deal of research has indicated
that individuals, demonstrating consistency needs in attitudes and actions, variously reduce any dissonance or incongruity that may be
provoked by the social context. Therefore, theories of cognitive dissonance, consistency and balance have implications for identification.144 This becomes particularly apparent when other studies on
138 McClelland & Atkinson, The Projective Expression of Needs: I. The Effect of
Different Intensities of the Hunger Drive on Perception, 25 J. PsycH. 205 (1948).
139 Levine, Chein & Murphy, The Relation of the Intensity of a Need to the Amount
of Perceptual Distortion: A Preliminary Report, 13 J. PsYcH. 283 (1942).
14oBrozek, Guetzkow & Baldwin, A Quantitative Study of Perception and Association in Experimental Semi-starvation, 19 J. PERSONALITY 245 (1951).
141 Bruner, Social Psychology and Perception,supra note 87, at 89.
142 Shrauger & Altrocchi, supra note 118.
143 See also studies reviewed in F. ALLPoRT, supra note 129, at 315-17.
144 See generally R. ABELsoN, E. ARoNsoiq, W. McGumaE, T. NwcoMB, M. ROSENA SOURCEBOOK (1968);
&

BERG
P. TANNENBAUm, THEORIES Or COGNITIVE CONsIsTENCE:
L. FESTINGER, A THEORY Or COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1951).
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person perception are examined. Secord 45 in a review of many of
these investigations found ample support for the proposition that people interpret certain physiognomic characteristics to represent personality traits. Thus, dark skin, of whatever race, is associated with such
characteristics as hostility, dishonesty, unfriendliness and slyness. It
is not too extreme to suggest that in a threatening situation such as a
crime, people may reduce cognitive dissonance by unintentionally
assigning to the attacker physical features associated with aggression,
violence or lawlessness. Allport and Postman provide a striking example of such a misperception.146 They reported a series of experiments in
which subjects were shown a picture of a white man holding a razor
and arguing with a black. Over half of the subjects described the black
man as holding the razor, and often as brandishing it threateningly.
What are the implications of these findings? It is difficult to draw
immediate analogies from the identification of such ambiguous stimuli
as food by hungry subjects to the effect of particular needs of the witness on his or her perception of the criminal. But, taken together,
these studies on psychological and physical needs establish that motivation does affect perception. Therefore, although we cannot easily
identify or control for certain kinds of needs, it is important for the
criminal justice system both to note and to stress that motivations may
distort the process of perception from the outset. Later, we shall
examine some additional ways in which motivational state may affect
identification accuracy at the lineup itself.
C.

Stereotypes and Prejudice

Research on stereotyping and prejudice similarly demonstrates
that identification may be riddled with inaccuracy. For example, the
relative inability to recognize persons from another group-racial,
ethnic or religious-has obvious implications for the identification
process. Seeleman' 47 found that prejudiced subjects, minimizing intergroup differences, were less accurate in recognizing individual blacks
from photographs. Malpass and Kravitz 48 reported that subjects had
greater acuity for faces of their own race. In a study by Pettigrew,
145 Secord, Facial Features and Inference Processes in Interpersonal Perception, in
PERsoN PacEmIoN AND INTaRPFSONA. BEmviOR 300, 301 (R. Tagiuri & L. Petrullo
eds. 1958).
146 G. ATLpoRT & L. PosmTAn, supra note 137, at 70-72, 99-100, 111-12.
147 Seeleman, The Influence of Attitude upon the Remembering of PictorialMaterial,
1940 ARcHimES Psych. No. 258.

148Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J.
sONATY & Soc. PsYcH. 330 (1969).

PER-
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Allport and Barnett, 149 identifying racial membership under conditions of considerable ambiguity, Afrikaner subjects more frequently
than other ethnic groups assigned composite faces to either "European" or "African" categories, rather than to categories of mixed
physical shade. Scodel and Austrin 5 ° similarly found that prejudiced
people, both Jewish and non-Jewish, were more likely to label photographs Jewish. Subjects were classified as prejudiced based on their
responses to the California F Scale which indirectly measures antiminority attitudes.'51 The general inference is one of predictable difference between the perceptions of prejudiced and nonprejudiced
subjects, but the matter is not quite that simple. Malpass and Kravitz's
findings suggest that members of another race may "all look alike" for
viewers even when prejudice is not controlled and that white faces
are generally more discriminable than black faces. 52 .
These findings have important implications for any identification
procedure which combines two factors: the values or emotions of the
individual, and cues too suggestive, too complex or insufficient to permit an unambiguous identifying decision. The context of the lineup is
a case in point. For, in particularly complex or ambiguous situations,
individuals will necessarily structure events to make them understandable, and in cases of ambiguity may be guided more by past experiences, needs and expectations than by the stimuli themselves. The
Allport and Postman findings,' along with the literature on person
perception,' 54 indicate that the problem of the effects of prejudice on
perception goes far beyond the phenomenon of "they all look alike to
me." The very same process on the part of prejudiced people may
occur in other areas of social judgment-for example, in attributing
crime to various social groups. To the extent that, to many people,
certain ethnic groups are associated with lawlessness and violence, and
perceptions are edited to conform to personal interpretations of reality,
fundamental perceptual and mnemonic errors may be made necessitating more sophisticated efforts for their discovery and correction.
VI. LINEUPS AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT
Without doubt the impact of social psychological variables on the
149 Pettigrew, Allport & Barnett, Binocular Resolution and Perception of Race in
South
150Africa, 49 BRiT. J. PSYCH. 265 (1958).

Scodel & Austrin, The Perception of Jewish Photographs by Non-Jews and Jews,

54 J. A o . & Soc. PSYCH. 278 (1957).
151 Id. 278.
I52 Malpass & Kravitz, supra note 148.
153 G. ALLiORr & L. PosimAN, supra note 137.
154 See, e.g., Secord, supra note 145; Shrauger & Altrocchi, supra note 118; Tagiuri,
supra note 130.
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perception and memory of a criminal event is of prime importance for
accurate criminal identification. In the police milieu, however, these
factors may again come into play, further compounding the errorprone process of person perception. Therefore, the legal system has a
particular responsibility in regard to the effect of psychological and
social structural variables at and on actual identification proceedings,
such as lineups.
For example, since lineup identification, like all identification, involves the three steps of perceiving, remembering and reporting, 1 3
the witness' motivational state at the time of the lineup is a crucial
component. The Supreme Court stated in Wade that "a victim's understandable outrage may excite vengeful or spiteful motives."',5 Students of criminal procedure have similarly explored the possibility
that revenge, even below the level of conscious awareness, might result in misidentifications. 57 It is also possible that the victim, as a
function of psychological or physical needs, may simply want to bring
the whole episode to a close as quickly as possible. Another powerful
motive could be the desire to avoid looking foolishly unable to identify
the "right" man. This motive is probably intensified by the fact that
for most people police officers are still authority figures, and even the
more cynical may attribute a degree of legitimacy to these professionals because of their particular expertise in this area. Alternatively,
far from making a dubious identification in order to perform adequately at the lineup, witnesses may anticipate (perhaps unrealistically) having to testify at the suspect's trial, and, fearing the
experience, they may refuse to make a correct identification. In addition, beyond witnesses' fear of revenge from suspects,' 5 8 they may
155 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
1 38S U.S. at 230.
157See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, supra note 12, at xiii; E. GARDNzR, supra note 13;
Hammelmann & Williams, Identification Parades-II, 1963 Caim. L. R.v. 545, 546.
158See Read, supra note 29, at 373-74 in regard to witnesses' being intimidated by
fear of revenge. In March 1971, the authors witnessed lineups held by a metropolitan police
department and interviewed police officers experienced in their conduct. See note 119
supra. The officers maintained that the more traumatic the crime, the less willing witnesses
were to identify. Illustratively, police officers indicated that robbery victims were more
likely than rape victims to identify suspects. Certainly there is no assurance that these
perceptions are not biased either by the class of cases these police officers witnessed or
by their own prejudices. Whether or not their conclusions are accurate, however, their
opinions stimulate a number of testable hypotheses. Several factors could explain why
robbery victims may be more inclined to make positive identifications: differing conditions under which the criminal was seen, the seriousness of the offense charged, fear of
retaliation, feelings of shame. Furthermore, rape victims may be equally willing to
identify, but have less solid information to go on. Or, since rape victims are only female,
while robbery victims include both sexes, the differing pattern may be due to sex differences in motives to avoid inaccurate identification. These are only some of the researchable issues that emerge for systematic, in-depth inquiry. Further preliminary investigation
would undoubtedly define and refine others.
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hesitate to contribute to sending anyone to prison, or they may be reluctant to publicize all the facts surrounding their presence at the
crime (for example, if testimony would expose an extramarital affair).
All of these reasons illustrate the wide range of factors potentially influencing witness decisionmaking at the time of the lineup. Quite
clearly motivational states whether conscious or unconscious could increase the danger of error, either the error of misidentification or the
error of nonidentification. Therefore, careful consideration must be
given to the dynamics of their emergence and mechanisms for their
potential control.
What the above analysis suggests-and what is important to
recognize-is that the victim or witness at a lineup is one "actor" in a
complex social situation. Thus, viewing the pretrial lineup, and all
pretrial confrontations, as paradigmatic of social interactions may
offer a new dimension for analysis. Such a perspective has the important advantage of acknowledging that normative behavioral patterns
may emerge as a function of the social structure of the lineup itself.
This, in essence, was the model the Wade Court adopted in saying:
"We do not assume that these risks are the result of police procedures
intentionally designed to prejudice an accused. Rather we assume they
derive from the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the
suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification."' 59
In addition to the role at lineups of such factors as emotional significance, motivational state, and stereotypes and prejudices, 10° other
social psychological variables may potentially inhibit an accurate identification process. Some of these include the power of group influence
and interactive pressures, the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding
both the task and the procedure, the social power of legitimate authority, and evaluation apprehension. The potential effects of these
variables-garnered from research in other social contexts-is overviewed below.
Changes in perception occur readily in response to information
from social sources. The enormous suggestive power of groups in
modifying perceptions, attitudes and norms was first illustrated experimentally by Sherif' 0 ' and then by Asch.'0 Sherif created the auto159 388 U.S. at 235.
1 60
See text accompanying notes 130-54 supra.
161 M. SB=1, TH PsyCHoLoGY oi SocIAa NoRms (1936) ; Sherif, A Study of Some
Social Factors in Perception, 1935 ARcmvns PsYcn. No. 187. See also Sherif, Group

Influences Upon the Formation of Norms and Attitudes, in RiADwGS iN SocrA

Ps

HoL-

OGY 219 (3d ed. E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb & E. Hartley 1958).

162 S. AscH, SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY ch. 16 (1952); Asch, Effects of Group Pressure
upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in READiNGs im SocIAL PsY oLoGY
174 (3d ed. E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb & E. Hartley 1958); Asch, Issues in the Study
of Social Influences on Judgment, in CONr0ITY AND DavATio 143 (I. Berg & B. Bass
eds. 1961).
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kinetic phenomenon with subjects. When an individual is exposed to
a fixed, pinpointed light under conditions of total darkness, an illusory
movement occurs. Sherif found that the emergence of group norms
resulted in concurring reports of this light movement. In groups of
both two and three, subjects' judgments converged in a group situation
after they first observed the light independently. Also, when the group
sessions preceded the individual ones, group influence was apparent
from the first group session through the final individual session."0 3
In the Asch experiment, subjects were simultaneously presented
with lines of different lengths and with blatantly incorrect judgments
about equality in length, delivered by the experimenter's confederates.
Again there was a convergence of judgments. Only about twenty-five
percent of Asch's subjects totally resisted group pressure and made
no errors in judging length. In the experimental condition, the mean
number of errors was 3.84 in comparison to .08 for the control
group. 0 4 According to Asch, some subjects were unaware that they
had yielded, others presumed the group was correct, and yet others
did not want to appear different or inferior. Whatever the underlying
motivation, a similar manifestation of conforming to group pressure
emerged.
Asch's research, while also exploring the effects of group pressure
on individual judgments, differed from Sherif's work in several important respects. The difference in the length of lines was a real difference, not an illusory one; the size of the group was larger; and
there was a decided discrepancy between the subjects' sensory experience and the reports of others. Both experiments, however, demarcate
the potency of group pressure in modifying judgments, despite awareness of a conflict between sensory and social information. While the
usual conditions of social suggestion are not always as extreme as
those represented by the Sherif and Asch arrangements, clearly some
witnesses to identical phenomena may markedly tailor their reports
to the majority position. And, in the case of criminal identification,
this "tailoring" could occur among witnesses at the scene of the crime,
in subsequent communication with or without police knowledge, and
at the lineup itself.
For us, the basic question is: what are the social arrangements
or group pressures in the lineup, and how might they affect individual
judgments of reality? The characteristics of a yielding, or changing,
163 M. SHuerI, supra note 160, at 95-105. In particular see id. 102-03.
16 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, supra note 162, at 177. Substantial individual differences in the number of
errors emerged. The maximum possible number of errors was 12, with a range of 0-11.
However, approximately 30% of the subjects erred in the direction of the majority's

estimates at least 6 or more times.
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also have been studied in various contexts, including condiminimal pressure. In a variation of the Asch experiment,
and Gerard' found that both public and private prior com(written judgments prior to group judgments) "markedly

reduce the socially influenced errors in both . . . face-to-face and

anonymous situations."' 66 Also their experiment showed significantly
less conformity when subjects expressed their judgments anonymously. Both field and experimental studies similarly confirm that
anonymity leads to a decrease in judgmental shift."' DiVestaJ 88 noted
that when initial social information was consistently unreliable,
changes in perceptual judgment decreased. Presently a lineup situation is not one typically characterized by minimal pressure; thus,
interventions to reduce pressure should be tested. For example, signed
descriptions of suspects by witnesses as soon as possible after the crime
might be required, and certainly anonymity, at least among witnesses,
should be preserved.
Particularly in ambiguous, unusual or threatening situations,
people are prone to judge the appropriateness of their behavior by
looking to what others do. This phenomenon, termed by French and
Raven "referent power," 6 has been demonstrated repeatedly in a
variety of research contexts. Illustratively, pedestrians were more
likely to jaywalk,' 70 subjects were more likely to volunteer for an experiment, 7 ' and people were more likely to violate a "no trespassing" sign 1'72 when they observed others doing so. 17

Under circum-

stances of difficulty, ambiguity or complexity, many studies confirm
the considerable social influence of someone considered to be an ex165 Deutsch & Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences
upon Individual Judgment, 51 J. ABNoRm. & Soc. PsYCH. 629 (1955). See also Hood &
Sherif, Verbal Report and Judgment of an Unstructured Stimulus, 54 J. Psycir. 121
(1962).

166 Deutsch & Gerard, supra note 165, at 633.
107 See, e.g., P. Zimmmmo, THE COGNiTIvE CONTROL

Op MoTIVATiON (1969); Raven
& French, Legitimate Power, Coercive Power, and Observability in Social Influence,
21 Socioia=sny 83 (1958).
168 Di Vesta, Effects of Confidence and Motivation on Susceptibility to Informational Social Influence, 59 J. ABNOR.. & Soc. PsYcr. 204 (1959).
169 French & Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUIiEs 3N SociAL PowER 150
(D. 17
Cartwright ed. 1959).
OLefkowtiz, Blake & Mouton, Status Factors in Pedestrian Violation of Traffic
Signals, 51 J. AxNOpm. & Soc. PsycH. 704 (1955).
171 Rosenbaum & Blake, Volunteering as a Function of Field Structure, 50 J. ABNoaR.
& Soc. PsYcH. 193 (1955).
172 Freed, Chandler, Mouton & Blake, Stimulus and Background Factors in Sign
Violation, 23 J. PERSoNALITY 499 (1955). This citation is to an abstract of an unpublished paper. In 1955, copies were available from A.M. Freed, University of Texas.
1t3 Studies cited notes 170-72 supra are reviewed in Collins' and Raven's excellent
chapter, Group Structure: Attraction, Coalitions, Communication, and Power, in 4
HANDBOOx OF SocrAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 1969).
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pert." 4 Evidently, in novel contexts, as in the Sherif and Asch experiments, 75 the actions or judgments of others provide informational
inputs and guidelines about the accuracy of judgments, the appropriateness of behavior, or the limits of permissible activity. These cues
are useful to the individual who is attempting to construe the meaning
of an event. Thus, to the extent that the lineup is characterized by
extreme ambiguity for the witness, a similar reliance on othersespecially expert police officers-might be expected. Perhaps if witnesses had greater clarity regarding what to expect and more accurate
information regarding the identification process, procedure and purpose, the influence of other actors in the lineup context would be substantially reduced.
While Asch's results on unanimity 76 underscore that introducing
another person into a group can markedly influence perception, suggestibility does not reside in numbers alone. Recognized or official
power provides another substantial source of influence over individuals. According to Collins and Raven, " [e]xpertise may be a basis for
establishing and limiting legitimacy." However, although "there may
be some correlation between expert and legitimate power . . . legitimate power should obtain even when there is no superiority in knowledge on the part of" the person in power. 1 7 Thus, Luchins and
Luchins observed that in conflicts between the official authority and
the majority, the verdict of the authority was given greater weight. 78
Milgram's now classic experiment 79 is a testament to the powerful
effect of a legitimate authority conducting a legitimate "scientific"
enterprise. In this research, subjects under request by an experimenter
induced what they believed to be painful, dangerously high levels of
shock to another subject who was actually a confederate of the investigator. Likewise Orne and Evans 80 reported that subjects persisted
at boring, meaningless or noxious tasks in compliance with experimental instructions. These studies are illustrative of a substantial
body of research evidencing systematic effects attributable to the
174Id. 176-77.
17 5
See text accompanying notes 161-62 supra.
17 6 Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against
a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCH. MoNoGRA'Hs No. 416 (1956).
177 Collins & Raven, supra note 173, at 178.
78
' Luchins & Luchins, On Conformity with Judgments of a Majority or an Authority, 53 J. Soc. PSYCH. 303, 315 (1961).
' 7OMilgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORM. & Soc. PSYCH. 371
(1963); Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18
Hum. RELI. 57 (1965).
80
Orme & Evans, Social Control in the Psychological Experiment: Antisocial
Behavior and Hypnosis, 1 J. PERsoxALrzy & Soc. PsYcH. 189 (1965).
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legitimacy of certain social roles and contexts. Therefore, the police
as a legitimate authority of the legal system may have a potentially
critical impact both on witnesses' judgments and on suspects' behavior.
Since the specific mechanisms mediating such effects are as likely to
be unintentional as intentional, systematic observation and manipulation are necessary to obtain both their detection and control.
Without knowing it, witnesses may alter their beliefs to conform
with those of others because of either a lack of confidence in their
perceptions or a desire to make contradictory perceptions fit together.
As one might expect, the problems of influence and suggestibility are
compounded by the fact that subjects are typically unaware of their
yielding behavior. Illustratively, Wrightsman's experiment 81 measured reported levels of anxiety of subjects waiting for injections.
Those in a "no talk" group condition changed their felt anxiety in a
direction closer to that of other group members. Without any knowledge, this convergence phenomenon occurred, suggesting that subjects
changed in response to subtle, indirect cues. Likewise, those who communicate suggestive cues or pressures are often equally unaware of
their action. An important area of social science research currently
dealing with such phenomena is called the social psychology of the
82
experiment.
Rosenthal has extensively investigated the various conditions that
enhance "experimenter bias"-that is, the subtle unintentional communication of expectations from experimenter to subject. 83 Dovetailing with Rosenthal's studies is considerable work that puts more
emphasis on the subject side of the social interaction. 8 4 Rosenberg
views the subject of an experiment as an "active" actor who is not
merely the recipient of experimenter "cues" but who is independently
engaging in information seeking, ambiguity reduction and the development of interpretive hypotheses. 88 His research on the conditions and
consequences of evaluation apprehension (EA) is exemplary of the
utility of this research movement for illuminating the lineup context.
181Wrightsman, Effects of Waiting with Others on Changes in Level of Felt
Anxiety, 61 J.

ABNORm.

& Soc. Psyc3r. 216 (1960).

182See, e.g., Orne, On the Social Psychology. of the Psychological Experiment:
With Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and Their Implications, 17 Am.
PSYcHOLOGIST 776 (1962); Riecken, A Program for Research on Experiments in Social
AND GroupS (N. Washburne
EXPERmwENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORzAL

Psychology, in 2 DEcISIONS, VAIuxs,

ed. 1962).

RESEARCH (1966);
Rosenthal, Experimenter Outcome-orientation and the Results of the Psychological
183R. RosEHaL,

Experiment, 61 PsYcH. BULL. 405 (1964); Rosenthal, On the Social Psychology of

the Psychological Experiment: The Experimenter's Hypothesis as Unintended Determinant of Experimental Results, 51 Amd. SCIENTIST 268 (1963).
184 See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Conditions and Consequences of EvaluationApprehension,
inA.RTACT I BEHAViORL RSRERCH 280 (R. Rosenthal & R. Rosnow eds. 1969).
1851Id. 344-46.
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For Rosenberg, evaluation apprehension is an anxiety-toned concern on the part of subjects that they win a positive evaluation from
the experimenter.18 Thus, when subjects, based on cues regarding
what they are to do, believe that one mode of responding is more "normal" or "competent" than another, data-biasing processes are likely
to be triggered. Analogously, witnesses at a lineup know that they
have been called in to make an identification and quite probably are
concerned about performing well, being helpful and not looking
foolish, particularly since the presence of a relevant authority figure
has been found to have an enhancing effect on EA. 18 7 In short, victims
or witnesses of crime do not want to be evaluated as atypical or abnormal in their ability to identify a suspect or in their performance as
good citizens. Therefore, they may be heavily oriented to gear their
behavior to be congruent with their image of what a "competent witness" is able to do. To counterbalance such an effect, specific instructions alleviating apprehension may need to be administered.
This excursion into work on the social psychology of the experiment is intended to underscore its particular relevance and applicability for refining lineup procedures and testing hypotheses regarding
lineup behavior. The lineup, after all, is a data-gathering, research
paradigm that desperately needs improvement in both design and
execution. And, almost by definition, this new field has particular
salience for any discipline "whose data are gathered through inter' .88
action between the investigator and other, investigated persons."'
Another fruitful area for consideration in the lineup context has
been the work on false report, suggestion and self-persuasion. There
is substantial evidence that an initially false statement may be distorted in a person's recall, engendering thereafter a belief that the
erroneous statement is correct. Bem conducted an experiment in
which subjects, after giving false information in response to certain
cues, were asked to recall the correct answers. He found that subjects,
under conditions normally associated in the subjects' experience with
truth-telling, tended to recall the truth less accurately and to believe
their erroneous confessions. 89 These findings suggest that once a witness' report has been changed according to some minimum inducement
and subtle pressure, self-persuasion regarding the truth of statements
188 Id. 281.
187 Id. 337.
188 Id. 323.
189 Bern, Inducing Belief in False Confessions, 3 J. PERsoNALIY & Soc. PsYcH. 707
(1966); Bern, When Saying is Believing, PsycE. TODAY, June, 1967, at 21.
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is likely to occur, and the error may be difficult, if not impossible, to
rectify. 9
As we already know, the possibilities of error-producing suggestion in questioning are substantial.' 9 Bem's research clearly underscores the potential effect of both police reassurances to victims and
other police procedures associated with truth-telling. Bern himself
noted that self-persuasion can distort recall of small, vital details surrounding a crime, including distorting eyewitness accounts.'92 This
phenomenon is a variant of Festinger's cognitive dissonance effect: 0 "
with strong pressure to elicit change in belief there is little tendency
to change, but with subtle or moderate pressure a person has "no good
reason" for his or her behavior and therefore may experience selfpersuasion. Since the lineup is one stage of a three- or four-stage
process and occurs after witnesses have been questioned at least once
by police, the situation is fraught with self-persuasion possibilities.'
And the problem is compounded by the fact that repeated questioning
is likely to strengthen commitment to a position.95
This work on self-persuasion is, of course, particularly valuable
to those investigating suspect confessions. A large proportion of the
cases handled by police every year involve confessions by suspects.
And a number of innocent people have confessed to crimes they did
not commit. As Philip Zimbardo phrased the issue for the law:
How can a court assess the amount of psychological coercion,
tell whether a confession was truly voluntary, or measure a
man's ability to resist pressure? Central in defining and
analyzing these questions is a knowledge of personality,
behavior deviations, performance under stress and deprivation, the 'social demand' implicit in a situation, persuadability, and the conditions for attitude change.'9
190See, e.g., Insko, Verbal Reinforcement of Attitude, 2 J. PERSoNAIarY & Soc.
PsYCh. 621 (1965).

191 See, e.g., Hildum & Brown, Verbal Reinforcement and Interviewer Bias, 53 J.
ADNoRM. & Soc. PsycH. 108 (1956).

192 Bern, When Saying is Believing, supra note 189, at 25.
193L. FEsTahmGER, supra note 144.

194 This is an excellent illustration of one area where defense counsel could facilitate
efforts to reduce erroneous identification. Through close observation, a lawyer may very
well be able to detect some self-persuasion processes.
195 D. McCARTY, supra note 75, at 181-82, reports a study on suggestive effects by
A. BmNET, supra note 48. Even when questioning was honest, subjects were susceptible to
subtle suggestion, especially when matters inquired into were vague. Forced memory was
responsible for 26% of the errors; when suggestion was added, error increased to 38%.
Once having committed themselves, witnesses had a tendency to stand by their statements
and finally believe them. See also J. MARsuALL, supra note 12, at 34.
196 Zimbardo, The Psychology of Police Confessions, PsYCH. TODAY, June, 1967, at

18. See also Zimbardo, Toward a More Perfect Justice, PsycH. TODAY, July, 1967, at 45.
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This article has urged an assessment of these same kinds of dimensions
for unraveling the dynamics of the lineup social exchange.
Many current police techniques regarding the handling of both
suspect interrogation and lineup identification reflect, perhaps unknowingly, a highly sophisticated application of the various psychological principles outlined above. Citing police practice manuals,
19 7 of
Zimbardo pointed out in discussing the demand characteristics
suspect interrogation: "Police manuals generally agree that the suspect
should never be interrogated in an environment familiar to him ....
The suspect must always feel that he is the 'guest' of the police. Indeed, 'By going to the police station the suspect has made the first
act of yielding.'""' Similarly, an examination of the ways in which
lineups are actually conducted makes clear how police practices may
enhance suggestive influences on witnesses. One such practice is the
"Oklahoma showup," in which the witness "accidentally" encounters
the suspect in custody prior to the lineup. 0 9 Another is the pre-lineup
identification of the suspect from photographs shown to the witness,
after which his identification of the suspect at the lineup tests nothing
but the accuracy of the photograph. 0 0 As of 1970, such obviously
suggestive procedures had a better than even chance of being upheld
by the courts. 2 01 Not only have multiple confrontations and the showing of photographs been commonplace, but also police may order only
suspects in lineups to don clothes described as being worn by the
criminal, place suspects in lineups where they differ markedly in
appearance from all other participants, and even point out suspects
with varying degrees of subtlety." 2
These widespread practices on the part of police suggest a
shrewd, pragmatic grasp of the dynamics of suggestion. This situation
raises two issues for the criminal justice system: whether police practices which utilize principles of suggestibility result in correct identifications, and whether these methods are consistent with societal norms
of justice even if the resulting identifications are correct. The issue
197 The term "demand characteristics" was first used by Orne in writing about the
social psychology of the experiment. Demand characteristics are cues in the experimental
setting that allow subjects to infer how they are expected to behave. Orne, supra note
182.
198 Zimbardo, The Psychology of Police Confessions, supra note 196, at 19.
199 See, e.g., No Panacea, supra note 5, at 368 n.43; Comment, supra note 21, at
398 n.31.
200 See, e.g., PretrialIdentification, supra note 5, at 798-803.
201 Id.
202See, e.g., E. BORCHiAX, supra note 12; J. MARsEL, supra note 12; P. WAIX,
supra note 12; Murray, supra note 42; Quinn, supra note 7; Read, supra note 29;
Sobel, supra note 7; No Panacea, supra note 5; Pretrial Identification, supra note 5;
Protection of the Accused, supra note 29.
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for criminal jurisprudence is straightforward. If unfair methods, intentionally and unintentionally suggestive practices, or abusive procedures result even in accurate identifications, the legal system must
ask itself whether the loss in justice is worth the gain in ostensible
efficiency. 20 3
VII.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH REFORM PERSPECTIVE

While the preceding sections present research findings and theory
important for understanding the criminal identification process, it is
impossible without systematic, scientific analysis to assess variables
in terms of the strength of their effect. In this article, we attempt to
raise some questions, discuss issues and provide guidelines. Our effort
is to reduce error and particularly to reduce identification judgments
that are artifacts of the lineup or pretrial confrontation procedure. To
remedy these problems, specific and well-aimed research is required.
Thus, what is most important is that a substantial number of reforms
-stemming from the theories and findings reported above-emerge
for testing and evaluation.
For example, the vagaries of perception and memory, documented
at least since Thucydides' time,2 °4 can be confronted at a variety of
levels. Preliminary sight and hearing tests could be employed to disclose gross sensory disabilities in witnesses. Alternative procedures for
witnesses' reports to the police also might increase accuracy and completeness. Forced memory has substantial limitations.2 °5 Marshall,
Marquis and Oskamp found that multiple-choice questioning considerably improved the completeness of recall but somewhat diminished
accuracy. 0 6 While such questioning is obviously impractical for initial
interrogation (although, as the authors suggest, it might be a useful
pretrial procedure), nonleading, structured questioning by police could
have much the same effect. This procedure might even reduce the
slight drop in accuracy which these investigators found with multiplechoice questions, although a recent report in the Police Research
Bulletin reaffirmed that free descriptions elicited more accurate identifications than did cued descriptions. 0 7
Similarly, a host of research and reform implications surround
the issue of improper suggestibility.20 8 On the one hand, group pres203 See Zimbardo, Toward a More Perfect Justice, supra note 196, at 17.
204 THucymEs, supra note 44.
205 See sources cited note 195 supra.

206 Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, supra note 82, at 1629.
207 Goulding, Facial Description Ability, 19 POLICE RasEa.RCH BuLL. 43 (1972).
208 For a sensitive presentation of these problems and approaches for their amelioration, see Erroneous Eyewitness, supra note 15.
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sure may not always be a potent factor. If there is only one witness
at a lineup or if witnesses are separated, 0 9 the potential for group
influence resides almost exclusively with the police. Yet police suggestion is extraordinarily difficult to control, even when police act in
good faith. It is not enough to do what some courts and police departments have already done-prohibit police officers only in very general
terms from verbally nudging the witness toward the suspect. As the
studies already examined on suggestive influence imply, 10 and some
additional recent materials confirm,"' much interpersonal communication is nonverbal. In all probability this is as true for lineups as for
other social contexts, and merely instructing the police to refrain from
making such nonverbal cues probably would be ineffective.
Wall 21 - strongly recommends that, by having the lineup conducted
by police officers not connected with the investigation of the crime,
chances for police pressure and suggestion would be reduced significantly. This procedure is in fact followed in England, Paris 13 and the
District of Columbia,2 14 where certain officers are assigned to conduct
all lineups. Depending on the size and degree of specialization within
the particular department or division, it may be unrealistic to assume
such officers will have no knowledge about which suspects have been
arrested for what crimes. But officers not involved in investigating a
crime might be expected to have a reduced stake, both conscious and
unconscious, in obtaining a positive identification. As a corollary to the
above, every attempt also should be made to minimize contact between
any police officer present in the lineup room and the waiting witnesses.
One can imagine the salutary effect of the police scrupulously
avoiding any suggestion to the witness that a person strongly suspected
is actually present in the lineup. 15 In addition to assigning different
209 See, e.g., H. BuaRr, supra note 67; P. WALL, supra note 12. Since Wade, this
practice has seen some support. Examples include the materials and model code outlined
by Murray, supra note 42; the guidelines set forth by the Oklahoma court in Thompson
v. State, 438 P.2d 287, 289 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968) ; the suggested procedures for Clark
County, Nevada, note 33 supra; the standards employed by the New York City Police
Department, note 32 supra.
210 See, e.g., notes 161-62, 165, 168, 181, 183 supra.
211
See, e.g., J. FAST, BODY LANGUAGE (1970); Duncan, Rosenberg & Finkelstein,
The Para-languageof Experimental Bias, 23 SocIomr:-rTY 207 (1969); Ekman & Friesen,
Non-verbal Behavior in Psychotherapy Research, in 3 RESEARCH IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 179
(J. Shlien ed. 1968); Exline & Winters, Affective Relations and Mutual Glances in Dyads,
in AF cT, CoGrnioN, Amn PERSONALITY 319 (S. Tompkins & C. Izard eds. 1965).
Also see references to Birdwhistell's work in N. FRiEDrAw, THE Socir NATuRE Or
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERMENT AS A SOCIAL INTERACTION

(1967).
supra note 12.
213 Id.46.
2 14
See Read, supra note 29, at 370.
215See, e.g., P. WALL, supra note 12, at 47-48; Sobel, supra note 7, at' 265;
212p. WALL,
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police officers to investigations and lineups, separating witnesses from
one another would help immeasurably in controlling suggestive influences. As indicated above,""6 segregating witnesses should be of particular value in preserving anonymity and in reducing informational
suggestion as well as group pressure to identify. Such a reform should
be one of the easiest to institute, both administratively and in terms of
police willingness to comply. For obvious reasons, this segregation is
best if imposed not only at the lineup itself but also before and after
the lineup. If witnesses who have observed the lineup are brought into
contact with other witnesses who have not, unintentional cues may be
communicated. Furthermore, even after viewing a lineup, witnesses
should remain separated and should be encouraged not to talk. Information regarding who, if anyone, was identified must remain confidential if subsequent viewing of other suspects is to have any validity.
For example, witness confidentiality is of paramount importance if
blank lineups (with no suspects) are to be administered. And certainly
17
the effect on accuracy of viewing multiple lineups should be tested
as well as the effect of viewing the same person more than once.
Further concern must be directed at the suspect-who is also an
Cactor" in this complex process. Although the Supreme Court ruled
that Wade's fifth amendment privilege was not violated by speaking
certain words or wearing "strips of tape,"21' 8 four of the nine Justices
dissented from this holding. Whatever the legal rule in this area, there
still remains the empirical question of the effects of intentional and
unintentional special treatment. Any action that calls particular attention to a suspect must be scrupulously avoided. For example, given the
impact of prejudice on perception,219 police officers should refrain from
using suspects' names-which might reveal to the witness their ethnic
background. Also, any unusual physical characteristics of the suspect
should be kept uniform among lineup participants (e.g., wearing
glasses). The impact of such uniformity on increasing accurate identifications could certainly be tested. In addition, however, the criminal
Erroneous Eyewitness, supra note 15, at 99-100; Pretrial Identification, supra note 5,
at 798.
2 6
1 See text accompanying notes 164-68 supra.
2 17
For a discussion of the utility of the "blank" lineup and other procedures, see
W'illiams & Hammelman, Identification Parades-I,1963 CRm. L. REv. 479, 487. See also
Sobel, supra note 7, at 302-03. In the District of Columbia, through use of the "Adams
order" (Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968)), suspects stand in
several lineups in addition to the lineup for the crime charged. This procedure provides
witnesses opportunity to observe more than one lineup. For a fuller explication of the
pros and cons of suspects' participating in multiple lineups, see Read, supra note 29,
at 368; Sobel, supra note 7, at 280.
218388 U.S. at 220-21.
2 19
See text accompanying notes 147-54 supra.
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justice system needs to ferret out the ways that lineup participants,
perhaps unconsciously, might call attention to themselves or to someone else. A stare or glance to the suspect from another lineup participant
could be sufficient to cue the witness. As Exline maintained,2 . head
and body cues as well as mutual glances are a meaningful source of
information.
Thus, one initial way to reduce lineup suggestion would be to
establish uniformly the kinds of regulations which several departments
have already adopted. 21 These include such measures as prohibiting
police from making suspects dress in clothes, make gestures, or utter
words described by witnesses unless all other lineup participants are
required to do the same; stipulating that lineup participants must be
of the same race and sex, and approximate age, height, weight, build
and coloring; and camouflaging any of the suspects' physical peculiarities. Alternatively the legal system might even consider the potential
utility of entirely different lineup-type formats. Wigmore's proposed
22
identification procedure could provide a useful model: 1
[A]t least 100 talking films would be prepared of [various
people]. Each would be photographed in a number of stock
movements . . . The suspect would be filmed in the same
manner. Some 25 of the films would be shown in succession
in a special projection room in which each witness would be
provided an electric button which . . . when pressed . . .
[would] indicate that the witness had identified a given
person .. the degree of hesitancy in
223 the identification to be
indicated by the number of presses.
But, even though this proposal has stringent, built-in controls, systematic research would be required for determining film format, preand postfilm handling of witnesses, and procedures for prior police
contact. In addition, evaluation studies are vital for adequately assessing the impact of this reform. 24
220
Exline, supra note 117. The
suspects cuing themselves is discussed
221 The procedures are outlined
supra note 29, at 380-93, apps. D, E,
supra.
2 22

problem of lineup participants cuing a suspect or
in Williams & Hammelman, supra note 217, at 489.
in a number of review articles. See, e.g., Read,
F; Sobel, supra note 7, at 301. See also notes 32-33

Two commentators ably demonstrate the potential of Wigmore's proposal for
reforming criminal identification procedures. See No Panacea, supra note 5, at 372-74;
Right to Counsel, supra note 5, at 849-53. As reported in No Panacea, 374 nn. 104-05,
107, a videotaping procedure for identification purposes has already been introduced in
the Miami Police Department.
223 388 U.S. at 239 n.30. This language is an accurate paraphrase of J. WiaMoRE,
THE SCIENCE oF JUDIC AL PRooF 541 (3d ed. 1937).
2 24
See Campbell, supra note 52. Scientific evaluation of attempts to remedy lineup
ills is strongly urged in Erroneous Eyewitness, supra note 15. This is as well a recurrent
theme in Zimbardo's analyses of police confession problems, supra note 196.
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We are now in a position to offer some illustrative research questions for the lineup context. Others could likewise be generated for
films, photographs and other identification procedures. Indeed, many
issues as to both human fallibility and suggestibility at various stages
of the criminal identification process have emerged for consideration
and planning. Therefore, the following ten sets of questions, while
perhaps reflecting our priority and focus on lineups, are only intended
to demonstrate that theory and research provide practical approaches
for realizing the charge of Wade, as stated by Sobel, "to avoid the
danger of 'wrong man' convictions as a result of the uncertainty and
unreliability of eye-witness identification."22' 5
(1) Does the legitimacy of a police officer conducting the lineup
affect the accuracy of witness identification? Does the authority's
approach (e.g., personal and solicitous or cool and official) have differential impact on a witness' behavior?
(2) Does prior contact (i.e., familiarity) with the police officer
conducting the lineup affect a witness' response?
(3) What is the cuing effect on identification accuracy of the
"lineup" police officer knowing or not knowing which participant is
the suspect? More generally, what kinds of unintentional cues pass
between "lineup" police officers and the witness, participants in the
lineup and the witness, and observers or counsel and the witness?
(4) Does either the witness' desire to cooperate, to be evaluated
positively by the police, or to appear in the "best possible" light induce him or her to confirm the police "hypothesis" in identifying a
suspect?
(5) What is the effect of certain attitudinal or personality variables of the witness on making an erroneous identification?
(6) What is the impact of prior communication among witnesses
on lineup identification (e.g., improve accuracy, increase witnesses'
need to pick a suspect, or provide a base of social support for no
identification) ?
(7) What does the witness believe his or her role is? How does
the witness' perception of role affect identification accuracy? Would,
for example, explicit instructions that "no suspect may be in the
lineup" reduce erroneous identifications by legitimizing negative responses?
(8) Does private or public commitment reflected in identifying
the suspect by prior verbal or written statement affect accuracy? Do
written or verbal statements differentially affect later susceptibility to
suggestive influences?
225 Sobel, supra note 7, at 324.
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(9) Does the presence of counsel at lineups reduce suggestibility?
How does the presence of an impartial observer influence a witness'
identifying behavior? How does it affect police officers' style or
behavior?
(10) Does differential stress (e.g., face-to-face in contrast to
one-way mirror identification) affect accuracy of recall or susceptibility
to suggestion? Does having the lineup participants "repeat the words
of the crime" rather than "say innocuous words" differentially enhance
accuracy or increase the magnitude of a witness' stress?
Given this type of research perspective and the questions enumerated here and before, the issue becomes how reform of the criminal
justice system should proceed. Since the institution of law, like all
social institutions, must place a high priority on meaningful reform,
the determination of methodology is of crucial importance. The best
way to evolve more effective standards and procedures is to introduce
alterations in the legal system while retaining flexibility. To paraphrase the innovative and sagacious advice of Donald Campbell:22 in
order to maximize options for change and rigorously assess changes,
reform must proceed through experimentation. At a purely methodological level, experimentation enables the most direct test of causality.
According to Richard Schwartz, the other methods, such as case studies
and survey research, "are useful in preparing for and supplementing
field experiments and in substituting for them where field experiments
are impossible. 2 7 Thus, while various results already proffered might
contribute immeasurably to improving the reliability and fairness of
criminal identification, a testing design built upon a field experimental
model would in the long run offer the criminal justice system maximum
output and utility.22 8

VIII. A

LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

At this point the focus shifts from psychology to law. The psychodynamics of eyewitness identification raise difficult and complex
legal questions. First, is an effort to improve identification procedures
on balance worthwhile, or would the gains be outweighed by the loss
of valuable evidence? Second, what remedies are likely to be most effective: changes in lineup procedure, participation of defense counsel,
22
0 Campbell, supra note 52; Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 Air. PsYCHOLOlST 409 (1969).
227 Schwartz, Field Experimentation in Sociolegal Research, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 401,
402 (1961).
228 Lloyd E. Ohlin addressed himself to experimental reform regarding the Miranda
decision. ALI MODEL CODE Or PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDVE: PART 11 149, 163-66
(Study Draft No. 1, 1968).
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or both? Third, what agencies may, or should, establish new regulations and safeguards: prosecuting authorities, legislatures, courts, or a
combination of these? Finally-a question of particular interest for
legal scholars-what are the particular limitations, if any, upon the
courts? Our survey gives ample justification for regarding all eyewitness identifications with scepticism.22 9 Although many legal experts
and scholars may find circumstantial evidence far more reliable than
visual identification, the latter could become more useful if abusive
practices were eliminated and vagaries controlled. And there is every
justification in arguing for the elimination of suggestion when visual
identification evidence is used.
Police offer counterarguments that suggestion might provide the
last bit of evidence needed to convict a suspect they believe is guilty,
and that convictions or guilty pleas would be more difficult to obtain
without identifications because of popular faith in the reliability of
identification. Such a standard cannot justify suggestion, and there is
no reason to presume that convictions are impossible or prohibitively
difficult to obtain without eyewitness identification. If the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently strong, an identification will probably
not be necessary. If the circumstantial evidence is weak, and police and
prosecutors are relying basically on their belief of guilt, the conclusion
of guilt is unjustified, even if the suspect is guilty. In short, research
indicates that suggestive influence can produce erroneous responses,
and that even without suggestion the processes of perception and
memory are often fallible. Also there are factors which probably
operate in favor of the police and which are not easily controlled.
Therefore, it is difficult to justify refusal to make reforms.
In addition to the several types of possible improvements already
mentioned, in the Wade trilogy the Supreme Court proposed another
remedy: the presence of defense counsel at lineups. Although it did not
specify what the lawyer's role was to be at the lineup, the Court reasoned that the presence of counsel would avert prejudice and assure
meaningful cross-examination at trial.23 ° Several commentators2 31 have
argued that the merits of extending the right to counsel to lineups are
dubious. If lawyers are permitted only to observe the lineup, as apparently is the case in most jurisdictions, 232 their possible contribution
2 29

See text accompanying notes 86-126

(Human Limitations on Identification)

supra.
230 388 U.S. at 232.

231 See, e.g., Read, supra note 29, at 362; Comment, Defendants' Rights During
Extra-Judicial Identification Defined, 17 DEPAuI, L. Rav. 583, 589 (1968); Comment,
supra note 21, at 396; Comment, The Right to Counsel during Pretrial Identification
Proceedings, 47 NB. L. REV. 740, 752-54 (1968).
232See, e.g., Read, supra note 29; Protection of the Accused, supra note 29.
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is limited, and they may do harm by lending an appearance of legitimacy. Even if lawyers are permitted a more active role, they may not
be sufficiently sensitive to important psychological variables. In other
words, as Read pointed out, lawyers' presence, whether active or passive, may have little or no effect on the dangers which the Court found
inherent in pretrial confrontations and upon which its holding was in
large part based. 233 The Court's recommendation of executive or legislative action suggests some awareness of these problems. The Justices'
preference for relying solely on the established and explicit constitutional right to counsel and not also imposing lineup regulations, for
which constitutional authority is very vaguely defined, is understandable, but perhaps overly diffident.234
It is not that the right to counsel should be abandoned. Indeed,
the lineup as presently conducted is a "critical stage." A lawyer
through observation, investigation and questioning could ferret out
many of the circumstances surrounding the identification (e.g., prior
witness communication), protect suspect rights (e.g., alleviate anxiety
that might result in suspect's cuing), or even balance the demand
characteristics placed on the witness (e.g., explain human limitations
on perception) .2 And Rosenthal's work on expectancy does show that
the mere presence of an observer reduced even unintentional biasing
effects. 23 6 Further, as one commentator suggested, "The presence of
lawyers at lineups will focus professional attention on the prickly issues raised by attempts to evaluate the reliability of investigatory
technique. ' 2' 7 Pressure from the bar might even lead to reforms that
could make counsel at lineups unnecessary. It would, however, be most
unfortunate if the presence of counsel produced a false sense of security which inhibited additional procedural reform.
The power of all relevant agencies except the courts to set up
regulations is well established. The more difficult question is, which
agencies are likely to develop the best regulations? Improvements to
date underscore the problem of leaving the task exclusively in the
hands of law enforcement officials. Not only may police departments
do the job poorly, they may prefer, as apparently has often been the
case, 238 not to do it at all. Unfortunately, the guidelines drawn up by
233 Read, supra note 29, at 365.
234 Comment, supra note 21.
235 See, e.g., text accompanying note 194 supra. Defense counsel could be useful
in a variety of areas, particularly detailed at text accompanying notes 127-54 (Social
Psychology of Identification), 155-203 (Lineups As a Social Psychological Context),
204-28 (A Psychological Research Reform Perspective) supra.
236 Rosenthal, supra note 183.
237 Comment, supra note 21, at 400.
238 See Read, supra note 29, at 367-68 n.85.

1126

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:1079

legal experts generally have been only slightly better. These facts suggest that ignorance may be a powerful factor in limiting the scope and
quality of such regulations. Further, there is evidence that lawyers may
share police attitudes to a greater degree than commonly supposed 39
However, one of the best sets of regulations resulted from collaboration between the district attorney and the public defender in Clark
County, Nevada, which signals another area wherein the adversary
principle might fruitfully be applied. Although defense attorneys may
be as unaware of psychological variables as prosecutors, and, indeed,
the Clark County rules did not have as much psychological sophistication as needed, the Nevada effort does set a precedent, which hopefully
can be improved upon as further reforms are tested.
Theoretically, there is much to be said in favor of the legislature
promulgating lineup regulations by statute. Laws have a legitimacy and
authority which rules established by executive agencies for their own
governance lack. This is true in part because the fresh and vigorous
judgment of a legislature represents "the best and most authentic
judgment of the state as a political body."24 Much of this authenticity
derives from the legislature's position as the governmental agency designed to be most responsive to and representative of the citizens of the
body politic. However, no meaningful legislative response in the lineup
41
arena has been forthcoming.
The agency whose proper role in this area remains to be discussed
is, of course, the judiciary. The Supreme Court and lower federal
courts could interpret the United States Constitution to establish minimum standards for the conduct of lineups as, of course, was done in
Wade and Gilbert. The appellate courts of the states can use the same
approach and rely on their state constitutions as well.
So far, however, the courts' performance has been very disappointing. Typically, courts have invalidated only the most flagrantly
unfair procedures, leaving untouched convictions in many cases where
improper suggestion was clearly present. For example, courts have generally held that an express police instruction to a witness which focuses
attention unnecessarily on the suspect is a violation of due process.242
243
The Supreme Court did reverse a conviction in Foster v. California,
where there was one three-man lineup in which the suspect differed
239 See, e.g., Tigar, supra note 37.
240 C. BLAcx, STRucTURE AND RELATIONSHPi

CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW 87-88 (1969).

241 See Read, supra note 29, at 379-80. See also text accompanying notes 17, 28
supra.
242 See Pretrial Identification, supra note 5, at 812.
243 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
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significantly in height from the other participants, a one-to-one confrontation between the witness and the suspect in a policeman's office
at the witness' request, and a second lineup about ten days later, with
the suspect the only participant from the original lineup. "In effect,"
the Court stated "the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the
man.'" 244 A Pennsylvania Superior Court condemned a similar series
of multiple confrontations.2 45 Both of these decisions displayed an appreciation on the part of the judiciary of the potential effects of suggestion.
But, as we indicated earlier, courts generally have displayed a
marked unwillingness to condemn any procedure where the suggestion
was any less blatant than the above. Even if we omit extreme examples,240 typical decisions have upheld convictions where witnesses
identified suspects after being shown photographs of them;247 where
suspects differed markedly from other participants in general physical
appearance, 24 complexion 240 or hair coloring; 2 ° and where suspects
were clothed differently from other participants,25 1 sometimes at the
direction of police." 2
Lower courts often justify their rulings in ways which quickly become familiar. As has been pointed out,211 judges have seized upon the
Stovall "totality of the circumstances" rule to broaden the scope of
their inquiry into the circumstances of the confrontation. For example,
the fact that witnesses spent a considerable amount of time in the suspect's presence2 54 and, therefore, had ample opportunity to observe
him is often used to counterbalance the effect of highly questionable
procedures. As one commentator observed, "'Totality of the circumstances,' when applied to lineups, appears to encompass both a consideration of external factors ... and a weighing process with respect to
244 Id.at 443.
245 Commonwealth v. Lee, 215 Pa. Super. 240, 257 A.2d 326 (1969).
241 See, e.g., Bradley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 974 (1970), where police said, "All you have to do is point him out. Ve know
we got him"; State v. Parker, 282 Minn. 343, 164 N.W.2d 633 (1969), where the suspect
alleged he had been assaulted by 3 Indians and the 3 suspects were the only 3 Indians in
a 6-man lineup.
247 See, e.g., United States v. Culotta, 413 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1019 (1970); People v. Romero, 272 Cal. App. 2d 39, 77 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
248 Parker v. United States, 400 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1097
(1969).
249 State v. Burch, 284 Minn. 300, 170 N.W.2d 543 (1969).
25
Massen v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 245, 163 N.W.2d 616, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1097
(1969).
251 See, e.g., People v. Chambers, 112 Ill.
App. 2d 347, 251 N.E.2d 362 (1969).
252 People v. Stanton, 274 Cal. App. 2d 13, 78 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1969).
2 53
See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
254 Pretrial Identification, supra note

5, at 815.
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the characteristics of the lineup itself, i.e., the unfair characteristics of
255 No
the confrontation are measured against the fair characteristics."
matter how suggestive some features of a particular confrontation are,
many courts will uphold a conviction if they find more good features
than bad.as
Even when judges do manage to separate the issue of fairness
from that of guilt in evaluating the "totality of the circumstances,"
this balancing process has dangerous pitfalls in its approach to disciplining police, being fair to suspects, and determining guilt. Affirming
convictions in cases where unfair police practices were used simply assures the police that they are free to continue those practices. Even if
the court criticizes the practices, it is not likely to affect police behavior unless cases are frequently remanded for new trials. The dangers inherent in creating precedents favorable to the continuation of
suggestive procedures are intensified because the great majority of
criminal cases is disposed of by plea bargaining, not trial. Therefore,
few suspects who are the victims of unjust police practices ever get a
chance for judicial review of their cases.
Furthermore, "totality of the circumstances" is profoundly wrong
in even more serious ways. The issue of justice is separate from that
of guilt, not only analytically, but in fact. A criminal procedure in
which an innocent defendant is acquitted, or a guilty one convicted, is
not necessarily just, simply because the empirically correct result has
255
256

Id.795.

One striking example of this occurred in State v. Redmond, 75 Wash. 2d 62,
448 P.2d 938 (1968). In thi case the victim of a holdup robbery identified the suspect
5 days after the crime in a lineup at which defense counsel was not present. The
robbery lasted only a few minutes, but the Washington Supreme Court found that the
victim's position-about 6 feet away from the suspect-and the emotional significance
of the event established a sufficient basis for an independent source for the identification.
The court accepted the trial judge's conclusion that:
An experience of that kind would be very apt to indelibly implant upon her
mind and memory, the vision of the man with whom she had just been in
conversation. And it is easy to understand why she would be able to identify
that man in Justice Court within a few weeks, and even in this court in a few
months.
Id. at 66, 448 P.2d at 940. This case is valuable for the insight it provides into at least
one judicial conception of the psychology of memory. Despite psychological testimony
at the trial level that an independent and untainted identification by this witness would
not be possible, the supreme court concluded the witness made an in-court identification
entirely independent of and untainted by the illegal lineup. For an excellent presentation
and analysis of the Redmond case, see Note, 45 WAsir. L. REv. 202 (1970). As this
commentator rightly concludes on the basis of psychological research,
A determination that the witness can make an in-court identification on the
basis of his original mental picture, unaffected by manipulative practices at the
lineup, is probably ill-founded. The processes of perception and identification do
not operate in such a manner. For legal analysis to comport with psychological
theory, the inquiry must be into how much the in-court identification was
affected by the lineup.
Id. 209.
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been reached. Our procedural safeguards derive not only from a commitment to acquitting innocent defendants, but from two additional
equally important values: the belief that there are certain things which
just should not be done to people, and the need to preserve the morality of the official actions of the government.2 7 Therefore, the "totality
of the circumstances" rule, as applied to lineups at least, must be replaced with an approach which searches for any improper suggestion,
whether intentional or unintentional, and rigorously roots out such
convictions.
Since no specific provision of the Constitution regulates the conduct of pretrial confrontations, 2 8 judges are thrown back on the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The use of the
due process clause to protect rights not specifically listed is well enough
established25 9 that the courts need not flinch from it. Because the lineup
is a critical stage that contributes to many false convictions, based
partly on human fallibility and partly on intentional or unintentional
suggestive practices, judges have plentiful justification under the due
process clause for regulating lineups as well as other pretrial confrontations. Indeed, this is exactly what courts, including the Supreme
Court, have been doing since Wade. The only error was the Court's
readiness to adopt a "totality of the circumstances" test, and the lower
courts' eagerness to broaden a rule of construction found wanting so
many times in the past.2"'
T
257See, e.g., L. FuVLLR, Tm MoR~r-r or LAw (1964); H. HART, PuNISHM
AND REsPoNsmLrY (1968); Andenaes, The Moral or Educative Influence of Criminal

Law, 27 J. Soc. Issuxs No. 2, at 17 (1971).
258 Several specific constitutional rights may be violated by the manner of carrying
out the pretrial identification procedure, although they do not regulate the procedure
itself, e.g., right to counsel (see the Wade, Gilbert, Stovall and Kirby cases themselves),
and right not to be arrested without probable cause, see Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d
574 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969).
250 As Justice Frankfurter stated for the Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
169 (1952) (citations omitted):
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause 'inescapably imposes upon
this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings
[resulting in a conviction] in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.' These standards of justice are not authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they
were specifics. Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee
of respect for those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice
wrote for the Court, are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental,' or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.'
Rochin concerned the forcible pumping of the defendant's stomach. See also, e.g.,
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (coerced confession cases).
260For an excellent critique and analysis of the "totality of the circumstances" test
and its application in lower courts, see Pretrial Identification, supra note 5, at 814-24
For a recent example, see United States v. Bothwell, 465 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1972).
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CONCLUSION

This review of the psychological dimensions of eyewitness identification has shown that the dangers from fallible sense perception and
memory and from suggestive influence are overwhelming. Perception
and memory are constructive rather than reproductive processes. They
depend to a great extent upon what is already in the mind of the individual. The mind is not a mirror which reflects the external world,
but an organism with its own needs, values and capacities-its own
vision of "reality" through which the outside world is interpreted. This
view of the human mind provides at least a partial explanation for the
wealth of evidence on the fallibility of perception and memory. We
know, further, that in some cases very little can be done to improve
this process. But we must undertake to assess when this prepotent
cause of erroneous identification cannot be eliminated, so that the
legal system may be adequately informed. We have also discovered
some of the social psychological dynamics of the criminal identification
process and the complexity of their effects. Finally, we have looked at
the multitude of possible suggestive and biasing influences at lineups,
searching for and pointing out ways of potential control.
Clearly the problematic nature of pretrial confrontations raises
issues that necessitate reform, as was the case in 1967 at the time of
Wade. Judicial rulings aimed at regulating lineups and extirpating improper suggestion from pretrial confrontations are one effective means
of bringing improvement. Legislatures and prosecuting authorities, of
course, are freer than courts to serve as "sociological laboratories,"
in Justice Brandeis' phrase. These groups might work effectively with
social scientists to develop and refine intervention procedures. As
Marshall, Marquis and Oskamp astutely concluded with regard to
testimony: "We urge that there be an ongoing collaboration between
lawyers and social scientists to carry out the empirical investigation
2 61
necessary to test .. . legal assumptions and practices.1
Thus, two recurrent themes pervade this article: a call for systematic research, and an equally immediate call for openness from
legal functionaries in the criminal justice system. The first theme may
seem the more difficult to implement. We have included suggestions
for beginning that process. The second, while superficially obvious, is
potentially the more complex. This theme requires the legal perspective, even of those engaged in strict advocacy, to be sensitized to a
scientific, problem-solving approach at each point in the criminal justice process.
261 Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, supra note 82, at 1639-40.
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An expanded perspective would include instructing victim, witness, judge, jury and public of the possible natural and social limitations
on accurate identification."' Imagine, for example, the effect on witnesses of a required instruction informing them that under certain circumstances accurate identification is almost impossible. How might it
affect identifying behavior and its accuracy to know that no identification is a legitimate option? Similarly, perhaps the jury might be instructed that in-court identification demonstrates more the witnesses'
ability to remember whom they identified at the lineup than whom
they saw at the scene of the crime, or the witnesses' need to reinforce
their belief in their prior statements, even inaccurate ones. Further,
if the latter be true, one might consider modulating the theatrics of
in-court identification. The specific procedural guidelines necessary to
achieve awareness of the real or potential dynamics affecting valid
identification must be developed by lawyers, perhaps in concert with
social scientists knowledgeable in theory and research. But one thing
is clear: even open communication regarding the known, the unknown
and the ambiguous would foster in the meantime an accuracy and
credibility that could only advance the basic aims of criminal justice.
262 The commentator in Erroneous Eyewitness, supra note 15, at 100-04, emphasizes
the importance of adapting jury instructions to be responsive to lineup problems. She
cites J. FRANK & B. FRaNx, supra note 12, at 200, who strongly support public awareness of the fallibility in eyewitness identification and the possibilities of error due to
prejudice, bias and suggestibility. Hammelman & Williams, supra note 157, at 555,
conclude that "in doubtful cases . . . a warning of the dangers of identification evidence
from the bench should become established practice."

